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We use novel longitudinal data from 19 monthly waves of the Singapore Life Panel to 
examine the short-term dynamics of the effects health shocks have on household health and 
non-health spending and income by the elderly. The health shocks we study are the 
occurrence of new major conditions such as cancer, heart problems, and minor conditions 
(e.g. diabetes, and hypertension). Our empirical strategy is based on an event study approach 
that exploits unanticipated changes in health status through the diagnosis of new health 
conditions. We find that major shocks have large and persistent effects while minor shocks 
have small and mainly contemporaneous effects. We find that household income reduces 
following a major shock for males but not females. Major health shocks lead to a decrease 
in households’ non-health expenditures that is particularly pronounced for cancer and stroke 
sufferers, driven largely by reductions in leisure spending. The financial impact of major 
shocks on medical saving account balances occur to those without private health insurance, 
while the impact is on cash balances for privately insured individuals. 
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Unanticipated health events can have serious consequences on the economic well-being of 
individuals and households. The occurrence of serious illness can leave households to cope 
with large medical expenditures, especially when access to health insurance is poor, and when 
publicly funded health care programs are inadequate or absent. Ill health can limit the ability 
of individuals to work and generate income, which in turn can affect household consumption.  
The importance of understanding the adverse effects of health shocks is more pertinent for 
elderly individuals, as ageing has become a more prevalent phenomenon in many countries1 
and acute health events become increasingly common at older ages. Exposure to financial risks 
from illness increases dramatically with age, as approximately half of lifetime medical 
expenditure is incurred after the age of 65 (Alemayehu and Warner 2004). While previous 
studies have documented that new health events result in cumulative income losses and 
increases expenses among aged population,2 evidence, as based on infrequent surveys, may 
suffer from two significant drawbacks. First, long recall period may lead to significant non-
random measurement errors of actual expenditures. Second, time-averaged measures can 
conceal significant short-term volatility in income and expenditure that are vital in determining 
the welfare of risk-averse individuals.  
In this paper, we analyse the impact of health shocks on households’ expenditures using new 
high-frequency longitudinal data of the elderly from the Singapore Life Panel (SLP). The SLP 
is unique in its tracking, on a monthly basis, of income, expenditure, health and labour market 
status of individuals 50 years and over in Singapore. The survey collects rich information on 
the different types of medical and non-medical spending by households, and captures 
information on a variety of major and minor chronic health conditions (e.g. cancer, heart 
problems, diabetes, hypertension). The distinctive feature of the SLP lies in the availability of 
monthly information on households, which permits us to obtain more accurate measures of 
expenditures and examine the short-term dynamics of health shocks on household’s medical 
and non-medical expenditures, and income. 
                                                     
1 For instance, the proportion of individuals over the age of 65 in the U.S. rose from 8% in 1950 to 13% in 2010 
and is expected to rise to over 20% by 2030 as the Baby Boomer generation continues to age (Lee 2014). 
2 For example, Smith (2005) and French et al. (2004) have used the biennial Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 
to document evidence on the impact of new health events on medical expenditures and income. 
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We find that major adverse health shocks (cancer, heart disease, and stroke) have large and 
persistent effects while minor shocks (such as diabetes and hypertension) have small and 
mainly contemporaneous effects. For example, individuals with major conditions, health 
spending increases by as high as 79 percent, and heightened spending is observed up to 6 
months after the shock. We also find that household income reduces following the onset of a 
major shock for males but not for females. Major health shocks lead to a decrease in 
households’ non-health expenditures that is particularly pronounced for cancer stroke sufferers, 
largely driven by reductions in spending on leisure. 
Our study contributes to the literature on assessing the economic impacts of ill health in the 
following ways. First, as stressed earlier, short-term income and expenditure volatility are 
crucial determinants of the welfare of risk-averse individuals. Previous literature has mainly 
focused on medium- or long-term consequences of a health shock due to data availability. This 
approach, however, conceals possible short-term volatile dynamics that may reduce expected 
utility among risk-averse households even though the impacts on time-averaged income and 
consumption remain the same.  In addition, short-term spike in spending may further 
deteriorate household welfare under the condition of liquidity constraints and financial 
constraints. The unique monthly SLP survey data that we use to conduct our analysis helps to 
contribute to the literature by uncovering possible short-term dynamics following a health 
shock. The implications of the analysis are important for policy makers in designing necessary 
tools to help vulnerable households to cope with temporary or persistent financial difficulties 
following a health shock.  
Second, the SLP data allow us to explore the impact of adverse health events with more 
precisely measured consumption information with a wide range of categories. The high 
frequency nature of the data helps to overcome potential measurement errors as often 
associated with traditional consumption measures. These measurement errors tend to be non-
random as households may systematically under-report spending when long recall period blurs 
memory. In this paper, we examine individual specific time variation in detailed health and 
non-health spending categories before and after receiving a health shock.3 One month recall 
period in the data collection procedure allows us to obtain this detailed information with greater 
precision. The detailed spending categories collected in the SLP allow us to better examine 
substitution between health and non-health consumption, and how this varies with spending 
categories and types of health shocks.  Overall, our estimated consumption responses are more 
                                                     
3 Details of the categorical spending are summarised in Table A.1 and Table A.2 
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informative, accurate, and reliable since they are likely to contain less non-random 
measurement errors for consumption compared with other often used data sources.  
Third, we study these issues within the context of Singapore, a well-developed country with a 
unique approach in financing health care. To our knowledge, most existing studies are in the 
context of low- and middle-income countries. 4  By conventional measures, Singapore has 
achieved excellent population health outcomes despite spending significantly less than most 
high-income countries. Much of its success has been attributed to its philosophy of individual 
responsibility in maintaining good health, and in paying for health care – most notably through 
a combination of individual medical savings accounts with a catastrophic health insurance 
scheme (see Section 2 for more details).  
Although whether Singapore’s success can be attributed to its health care financing system is 
a question that has been extensively discussed (Hsiao 1995; Barr 2001; Haseltine 2013; McKee 
and Busse 2013), there has been little rigorous empirical evidence on the performance of 
Singapore’s health care system due in a large part to the lack of detailed individual or household 
level data on health spending. Particular mention should be made of the work by Chia and Tsui 
(2005) who examine the adequacy of medical savings accounts in Singapore by calibrating 
health care expenditures using semi-aggregated spending data.  
Singaporeans have access to “self-insurance” in the form of a compulsory savings scheme 
called Medisave and private health insurance which is accessed mainly through their employers 
(more details about the Singaporean financing system is given in section 2). While it might 
appear at first blush that access to such extensive insurance protects Singaporeans from the 
financial impact of health shocks, this is an empirical question that we seek to address.  In 
particular, our study is able to compare the end of year financial position of those who suffered 
a health shock with those that didn’t. If indeed Singaporeans are fully protected against shocks, 
we would expect to see limited depletion in their assets. We find that across the board, health 
shocks are associated with a reduction in the end-of year cash balances. However, only those 
without private insurance suffer a depletion in their Medisave balances. The results suggest 
                                                     
4 In these studies, the focus is on how individuals and households cope with the financial consequences of health 
shocks. While much of the evidence finds that ill health leads to a reduction in household income and consumption 
(e.g. Gertler and Gruber 2002; Sparrow et al. 2014; Wagstaff 2007), there are some studies of households being 
well insured against illness (Townsend 1994; Kochar 1995), even in the absence of health insurance (Liu 2016). 
A key question here is whether households can smooth food and non-food consumption in the presence of shocks. 
Access to formal (e.g. microcredit) and informal credit, as well as borrowing and gifts from family and friends 
(Wagstaff 2007), have shown to be important mechanisms through which households cope with shocks, without 
needing to sell assets such as livestocks (Mohanan 2011; Islam and Maitra 2012). See also Kruk et al. (2009) for 
a review of 40 countries. 
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that private insurance cushions the impact of shocks on Medisave balances but does not fully 
protect the overall financial position.  
The findings in this paper provide concrete evidence on the extent to which individuals cope 
with health shocks in this context, which is useful for cross-country comparisons and drawing 
implications from Singapore’s experiences. 
Finally, our study of the short-term dynamics of medical expenditures complements a small 
body of work that examines the persistence of medical expenditures over time. Much of the 
existing studies are US-centric, and have used data from the biennial Health and Retirement 
Survey (HRS) (French et al. 2004), the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (Monheit 2003) 
where households are surveyed five times over a two-year period, data of Medicare 
beneficiaries (Rettenmaier and Wang 2006; De Nardi et al. 2016) and claims data (Hirth et al. 
2016). Recent work by Dobkin et al. (2018) use an event study approach to examine the 
economic consequences of hospital admissions using the data from the HRS, as well as data 
from credit reports (e.g. unpaid medical bills, bankruptcy). The richness in the Singapore Life 
Panel lies in the availability of detailed information every month on households’ health 
expenditures, and health conditions of household members. The nature of the data allows us to 
obtain more accurate measures of income and expenditures and to uncover possible short-term 
volatility in these measures following a health shock. 
Our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional context of Singapore's 
health system. Section 3 provides a background to the Singapore Life Panel. Section 4 
discusses the data used in the analyses, and the econometric methods. The results from our 
analyses are discussed in Section 5, followed by a discussion of our findings in Section 6.  
2. Institutional Context 
Singapore is a high income country, with a GDP per capita of US$52,888 in 2015, similar to 
that of the US. In 2013, total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP is 4.6 percent and 
health spending on a per capita basis amounted to USD$2,507 (World Health Organisation, 
2015) The Government's share of total health expenditure is 40 percent. Private sources of 
funding accounted for the remaining 60 percent, and comprise of contributions by individuals 
in the form of out-of-pocket payments, private insurance and employer-provided benefits, as 
well as payments out of publicly managed health insurance programs and mandatory medical 
savings accounts (see elaboration below). 
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Health services are delivered through a combination of public and private providers. The public 
sector provides 80 percent of acute care through public hospitals financed via a mix of block 
grants and Diagnosis-Related Groups casemix payments by the government. The cost of 
hospitalisation in public hospitals are subsidised by the government, and the amount of 
subsidies vary from zero to up to 80 percent depending on the level of hospital amenities that 
patients choose to receive. Private hospitals account for the remaining 20 percent of acute care 
services and do not attract any government subsidy. The private sector dominates the primary 
care sector, with private medical clinics delivering 80 percent of primary care services. The 
government runs a network of clinics providing subsidised primary care, which also serves as 
a point of referral for specialist and hospital care in public hospitals.  
Complementing government subsidies is a core set of three public programs that allow 
individuals to pay for their health care. The first program is a compulsory medical savings 
scheme Medisave which was introduced in 1984. Under Medisave, employed individuals 
contribute between 8 percent to 10.5 percent of their monthly wages, depending on their age, 
to a mandatory medical savings account. Contributions by self-employed individuals depend 
on the income reported in the preceding year. Individuals can withdraw funds from the 
Medisave accounts to pay for their own health care expenses, or those of their immediate 
family. There are limits on how much can be withdrawn from Medisave accounts and these 
vary depending on the types of expenditure and medical conditions. Expenses in excess of these 
limits are paid as out-of-pocket payments. Medisave can be used to pay for the cost of inpatient 
hospitalisation and approved day surgeries in both public and private hospitals, as well as 
outpatient treatments for certain chronic diseases (e.g. diabetes, hypertension), vaccinations 
and health screenings. There is a maximum that individuals can accumulate in their Medisave 
accounts and contributions in excess of this maximum are transferred to individuals' 
compulsory savings accounts that are earmarked for retirement purposes. Upon death, 
remaining funds are transferred to nominated beneficiary, or distributed according to 
intestacy laws. 
A second program is Medishield, a publicly managed catastrophic health insurance scheme 
introduced in 1990 that covers large hospital expenses and certain expensive outpatient 
treatments (e.g. dialysis, chemotherapy). Premiums for Medishield can be paid using funds 
from individuals’ medical savings accounts. In 2015 Medishield was replaced with Medishield 
Life and made compulsory. Medishield Life covers part of the costs of an inpatient hospital 
stay.  It also covers some selected outpatient care (cancer therapy, dialysis, and 
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immunosuppressants therapy for organ transplant).  There is an annual maximum claim of 
$100,000, annual deductible (which depends on what class of ward the patient uses) and 
copayments between 3% and 10% depending on the size of the bill. For class C ward or day 
surgery, the deductible is $1,500 and for class B2 ward it is $2,000.  While there are no 
deductibles for outpatient services covered by Medishield life, there are additional claim limits. 
For example, Medishield life will pay the lower of 90% or $3,000 for a cycle of chemotherapy. 
The proportion of the bill that the patient pays can come out of their (or family’s) Medisave 
account or they can pay it in cash.  A typical bill for heart attack would be $8,000 of which the 
patient would pay 30%.   
An alternative to Medishield Life is the Integrated Shield Plan (IP) which bundles a Medishield 
Life plan with a private insurance plan approved by Government. Enrollees can use their 
Medisave accounts to pay the premium. The enrollee in an IP is essentially purchasing the 
Medishield Life plan from Government and an additional component provided by private 
insurers. IP plans presently in the market range from the basic plan to comprehensive. The most 
basic plan removes the upper limit on daily hospital charge so that patients can go to private or 
Class A wards if they wish.  At the other end, there are IP plans which as well as covering 
higher price hospital stay, also cover a wider range of services such as pre- and post-
hospitalisation treatment. All IP plans - however expensive - have 10% coinsurance, 
deductibles based on class of ward and annual limits. These deductibles and copayments means 
that even if patients have IP plans, they might choose to use lower class wards or public rather 
than private hospital in order to reduce their bill. IP premiums can be paid using Medisave 
balances, although there is a cap on how much can be paid.  
The third program, Medifund, is an endowment fund established to assist poor and needy who 
are unable to afford their medical expenses. The scheme serves as a safety net for those who 
face financial difficulties in spite of government subsidies. Strict eligibility rules apply for 
Medifund assistance. 
Outside the Government controlled 3M (and IP) system, individuals may purchase wholly 
private insurance. Premiums for private insurance are paid either from cash or as a fringe 
benefit provided by the employer. Private insurance can provide first dollar coverage (called 
“rider” coverage) which covers the patient’s part of the bill from the IP plan (i.e. the deductible 
and the copayment). Private insurance plans can also include a wide range of services such as 
home care and step-down care. The popularity of so called rider-insurance has been a bone of 
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contention with the Government. The concern is that by insulating patients against the full cost 
of care, these allow higher fees to be charged by doctors (Health Insurance Taskforce, 2016).   
3. Background to the Singapore Life Panel 
This study uses 19 monthly waves of data from the Singapore Life Panel. In 2014, the Centre 
for Research in the Economics of Ageing (CREA) was established at the Singapore 
Management University to study the economics of ageing in Singapore, and CREA 
commenced a major data collection program. This data set is the Singapore Life Panel (SLP), 
and is a population representative sample of Singapore citizens and residents aged 50 to 70 
years. Similar to the RAND Life Panel and the Tilburg LISS, the survey is answered on-line 
on a monthly basis.  
Recruitment for the Singapore Life Panel took place between May and July 2015, and 25,000 
addresses were sent invitation letters. The addresses were provided to CREA by the Singapore 
Department of Statistics where it was believed that there was at least one person who was 
eligible (i.e. a citizen or resident and aged between 50 and 70). Additional documentation on 
the collection methods is available in Vaithianathan et al. (2017).  
Canvassing occurred through both personal visit and telephone contact and 11,511 eligible 
households were recruited to the panel representing 15,212 respondents. This initial cohort 
corresponds to a response rate of 52% of all households invited to participate. Once recruited, 
the panel were invited to participate in monthly surveys. These surveys started with a pilot in 
August 2015, where only 1000 participants were asked to respond. The survey of all 
respondents recruited commenced from September 2015 onwards. Each month the survey 
asked respondents about their household spending, income, labour force status, health, 
household size, and subjective well-being. While these questions were repeated monthly, other 
questions were only asked quarterly or on an ad-hoc basis. For example, in January 2016 and 
2017, two major asset survey modules were conducted where respondents were asked about 
their financial assets, annual income and intra-household transfers. 
Given that the present paper utilises the household spending data, we need to establish whether 
the spending data being generated by the SLP accords with other published survey data that is 
population representative. Figure OA.1 in the online supplementary materials compares the 
monthly household expenditure reported by the SLP respondents with published data from 
Singapore Statistics. The data suggests that (at least for the first 4 waves of the SLP) the 
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published statistics and SLP show very similar patterns – although the SLP suggests a slight 
rightward shift-  which might be expected given that the period of coverage for SLP was 2016 
and the average inflation rate in 2013 was 2.4% and in 2014 was 1%.  
We also compared baseline demographic and economic features of the SLP respondents with 
published official statistics, and found them well matched. For example, 27% of the SLP 
sample had no formal schooling or only Primary compared to 29% of the comparable cohort 
from the 2010 Census of population. Additionally 31% of the SLP had post-secondary or 
tertiary education compared with 31% of the comparable Census cohort.  
Table A.1 provides the sample size of respondents and households in each wave.  Wave 0 is 
the baseline wave conducted at the time that a respondent agrees to be part of the panel during 
the recruitment period May and July 2015.  We have 11,536 respondents from 8,723 
households who were in the 50-70 age category and who completed the baseline survey. The 
baseline survey did not ask about detailed consumption questions but rather asked basic 
demographic information. Wave 1 was a “pilot wave” and only 1,000 households were invited 
which account for the smaller number of respondents. 
Starting in August 2015 (wave 2), all panel members were invited to answer an approximately 
15 minute survey which asked about their labour market status, health, subjective well-being 
and spending. Response rates have been remarkably stable for the first 19 months of the survey 
from wave 2 onwards, consistently eliciting around 7,500 age-eligible responses (Table A.1).5  
4. Methods  
4.1 Defining Health Shocks  
We define a health shock as a new diagnosis of a chronic condition.  In the baseline survey, 
respondents were asked the following question: Has a doctor ever told you that you have any 
of the following conditions? Please check all that apply. The conditions offered were 
Hypertension, Diabetes, Cancer, Heart problems, Stroke, Arthritis, Psychiatric problems and 
None of the above. Thereafter, at every monthly survey, the respondents were asked a two part 
question: In [last month] (last calendar month), were you seen by a medical doctor? If they 
replied yes to this question, they were further asked: In [last month], did a doctor tell you that 
                                                     
5 The number of respondents in January 2016 (wave 6) is higher as respondents were paid more money to complete 
the additional annual asset module (Vaithianathan et al. 2017). A similar inducement was offered in January 2017 
though there was no similar increase in completion rates.   
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you have any of the following condition? Please check all that apply. The same list of 
conditions were presented to them.  
We define a condition being newly diagnosed in some month t, if the respondent did not have 
that diagnosis in the baseline, or in any month t-1 but in month t answered that they had visited 
the doctor and been told that they have that condition. Given the large set of conditions, for 
ease of interpretation, we define two subgroups: minor and major conditions. “Minor 
conditions” consist of Arthritis, Diabetes, Hypertension or Psychiatry, and “major conditions” 
are Cancer, Heart or Stroke. 
The distribution of medical conditions at baseline and new diagnosis is shown in Table 1. The 
most prevalent minor condition is chronic hypertension with 3,320 (29%) reporting having 
hypertension in the baseline. An additional 895 respondents newly acquired the condition 
between the time they completed the baseline survey (between May and July 2015) and 
February 2017 (wave 19), corresponding to an incidence rate of 11%.  The second highest most 
prevalent condition is diabetes (1,667 in the baseline) with only 414 reporting a new diagnosis 
after 19 waves.  For arthritis, 1,193 report having this condition in the baseline, and 819 report 
a new diagnosis. A plausible reason for high incidence rate for arthritis may be the salience of 
the disease – a respondent might not recall ever being told about having arthritis at baseline, 
but might be able to recall being told about it at the last doctor’s visit.  
Heart disease is the most common of all the major conditions we study, with 805 (7%) 
respondents reporting having been told they have the condition at baseline, and 480 acquired 
the condition after 19 waves, corresponding to an incidence rate of 4.5%. 372 respondents 
(3.2%) reported at baseline to have had cancer, and 168 (1.5%) had a stroke and the incidence 
rates after 19 waves are 1.3% and 0.8% respectively. The incidence rates of both major and 
minor conditions in the SLP are broadly comparable with those from the Health and Retirement 
Survey, where workers age between 50 to 60 years were found to have a 5% chance of suffering 
from a heart attack, stroke, or a new cancer diagnosis, and a 10% chance of being diagnosed 
with a new chronic medical condition over a two-year period (Coile 2004).  
At each month of the survey, the respondents were asked the following question on the amount 
they spent on health care services: Please provide your best estimate of how much in total [You 
and your spouse] spent in [last month]. The five health spending categories are shown in Table 
A.2. Within each category they are also offered exemplars. Respondents are asked to provide 
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information on out-of-pocket cost and funds paid from Medisave. We derive a measure of total 
monthly spending on health care services by summing over the five health spending categories.  
The distribution of health expenditures by households for different categories of health 
spending and conditions are shown in Table 2. The mean total monthly spending (Panel A) on 
health care in the full sample is $153, and is higher among respondents who reported to have a 
major condition ($306) or a minor condition ($198) at some point in the survey. Of all 
respondents who have had positive spending (Panel C) in any given month, the mean total 
monthly spending is $319, and is highest for hospital services ($854.3) followed by home 
nursing ($422).  
As noted in Panel B of Table 2, a substantial proportion of respondents in our sample reported 
to not have any monthly medical spending. This is largest for hospital and home nursing, where 
only 5.1% and 0.7% of respondents have positive expenditure. Overall 48% of the sample has 
positive total health spending. We accommodate this feature of the data in the econometric 
modelling using the two-part model, which we describe below.  
 
4.2 Econometric Strategy 
Following Dobson et al. (2018), we adopt an event study approach to study the effects of health 
shocks on our outcomes of interest. Our model is based on the classical two-part model adapted 
to panel data. The first part of the econometric model examines whether an individual incurs 
medical expenses in a given month. The second part models the logarithm of monthly 
expenditure for those who report positive medical spending. Formally the model is written as  
𝒅𝒊𝒉𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝒕 ∑ 𝑺𝒊𝒉𝒕
𝟏𝟐
𝒕=−𝟐
+ 𝜸𝟏𝒕 + 𝒄𝟏𝒊 + 𝒗𝟏𝒊𝒉𝒕 (1) 
𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊𝒉𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒕 ∑ 𝑺𝒊𝒉𝒕
𝟏𝟐
𝒕=−𝟐
+ 𝜸𝟐𝒕 + 𝒄𝟐𝒊 + 𝒗𝟐𝒊𝒉𝒕 (2) 
where 𝒅𝒊𝒉𝒕 takes the value of 1 if the i-th individual has non-zero expenditure for health service 
h (e.g. hospitalisation, prescription medications) in month t, and 0 if the individual has zero 
spending. 𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝒚𝒊𝒉𝒕 is the logarithm of expenditure incurred by individual i for health service h, 
in month t. To quantify the monthly dynamics of the effects health shocks have on 
expenditures, we include as regressors a set of binary variables 𝑺𝒊𝒉𝒕 representing the forward, 
contemporaneous and lagged time periods 𝑡−2, … 𝑡0, … 𝑡12 from the month of the shock. For 
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example, 𝑺𝒊𝒉0 takes the value of 1 in the month (𝑡0) of the shock, and 0 otherwise. The binary 
variable for the last time period, 𝑆𝑖ℎ12, is coded to capture the 12th month and all subsequent months 
thereafter. The coefficient estimates of 𝛼𝑡 and 𝛽𝑡, for all t individually capture the effects of 
health shocks on health expenditure from time 𝑡0, where the health shock occurred, for every 
subsequent month up to 12 months. 𝑐𝑖 is an individual fixed-effect; 𝛾𝑡  is a set of monthly wave 
dummies and 𝑣𝑖ℎ𝑡 is an error term. 
For the coefficient estimates of 𝛼𝑡 and 𝛽𝑡 to be interpreted as casual requires the identifying 
assumption that the occurrence, and timing, of the health shock is uncorrelated with the 
outcome, after conditioning on the individual and month effects. There are two key scenarios 
that could violate this assumption. The first scenario is if individuals with health conditions 
that are not severe, which require a lower intensity of medical care (and at lower costs), are 
less likely to see a doctor. This results in the classical sample selection problem. The second 
scenario is if adverse health outcomes are brought about by events such as job losses (e.g. 
Sullivan and Wachter 2009, Browning and Heinesen 2012), or if the health shock follows a 
period of deteriorating health.  
To address these potential threats, we exploit unanticipated changes in health status through 
the diagnosis of new health conditions. We focus our attention on individuals with major health 
shocks – cancer, health disease and stroke – which are conditions that are likely to occur 
suddenly and are largely unexpected. The focus on major conditions that are severe in nature 
would minimise sample selection bias that arises if it is indeed the case that the probability of 
seeking treatment depends on the severity of individuals’ conditions. The emphasis on new 
conditions would also reduce the possibility that individuals health status were deteriorating 
prior to the shock. For completeness, we also study individuals with minor health conditions, 
though these results will necessarily be qualified. 
Our model specification allows us to directly test whether the health shocks we document are 
unanticipated. This involves testing if the coefficient estimates on the binary variables that 
represent the time periods one (𝑡−1) and two (𝑡−2) months prior to the onset of health shocks 
are statistically significant from zero. If the coefficient estimates on these forward time 
variables are significant, this would imply the presence of anticipatory health spending. As a 
further robustness check, we test if there exist an anticipation effect for a longer duration of 
time by estimating an alternative specification that includes 12 lead binary variables. 
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We estimate both equations using linear panel data models with individual fixed effects 
(“within” estimator) and allowing for heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors 
at the household level. For the logarithm of expenditures, we retransform predictions of log 
expenditures into its levels using the Duan smearing estimator in the calculation of the 
incremental effect of shocks on health expenditure in dollar terms. The wave dummies capture 
possible time-varying expenditure due to seasonality and macro-economic shocks. 
5. Results   
5.1 Health Shocks and the Dynamics of Health Expenditures 
How does health shocks affect monthly health care expenditure? The key coefficient estimates 
are presented in Table 3, which shows the effect on total health expenditure in the period the 
shock occurs, denoted as period 𝑡0, up to 12 months (𝑡1 to 𝑡12) after the onset of illness. As 
discussed above, these estimates are obtained from the linear individual fixed effects model 
hence they are interpreted as the impact on health expenditure from within-individual variation 
in health shocks. Specifically, these coefficients capture how much an individual spends in 
each period on, and following, a health shock, over and above the amount they spent averaged 
over three months or more before occurrence of the shock.  
The results in Table 3 show, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the contemporaneous effects of health 
shocks are the largest. Individuals with major and minor shocks are 17.3 and 20.4 percentage 
points more likely to report having positive total health expenditures (columns 1 and 2). With 
regard to the amount of spending, individuals with major shocks have significantly higher total 
health expenditures, with spending levels increasing by 79.3% compared to pre-shock levels. 
Individuals with minor shocks where total health expenditure increased on average by 19.5% 
(columns 3 and 4). 
The availability of monthly data permits us to estimate the monthly dynamics of health care 
expenditure following a health shock. In Table 3, the coefficient estimates for periods 1 to 12 
months after the shock indicates that while the impact on spending attenuates over time, it 
persists for up to 6 months following the occurrence of the shock. These temporal effects are 
summarised in Figure 1.  Both major and minor shocks increase the probability of reporting 
positive expenditures by a similar quantum and with a similar temporal pattern (see top figure 
in Figure 1). In contrast, they show very different effects on the level of expenditures. For 
individuals with major conditions, heightened spending is observed up to 6 months after the 
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shock, as well as at the 9th to 12th months (bottom figure in Figure 1). Minor conditions, 
however, have a smaller and transient impact, with the effect disappearing after one month. 
We also find that while health shocks generally have a positive effect on health expenditures, 
the scale of impact affects different types of health expenditures differently (Tables OA.1 and 
OA.2 in the online supplementary materials). Individuals who have experienced a major health 
shock are more likely to have positive expenditures and have higher levels of spending for 
hospital services, as well prescription medications, compared with those with minor health 
shocks.  
We included forward time variables to assess if health expenditures increase before shocks 
occur as an empirical test of the assumption that health shocks are not anticipatory in nature. 
These results are found at the top of Table 3. The coefficient estimates on these forward 
variables are not statistically significant for the major conditions we study, that is cancer, heart 
disease and stroke. For minor conditions, the coefficients of the temporal effects one month 
before onset is statistically significant. These results provide support that the major health 
shocks that we analyse are largely unanticipated, but not for minor shocks. 
 
5.2 Health Shocks and Incremental Expenditures 
We now turn to calculating the actual incremental spending on health that results from a health 
shock. We use the coefficient estimates from separate fixed effects models for each major 
condition, Heart, Cancer and Stroke, and for all minor conditions together. We transform log 
expenditures using the Duan smearing estimator (Duan 1983).  Our estimates are interpreted 
as the average incremental effects of a shock on monthly health expenditures for each time 
period 𝑡−2 to 𝑡0, and subsequently 𝑡1, to 𝑡12.  
The incremental effect estimates are shown in Table 4, and summarised graphically in Figure 
2. Total expenditure on health is highest for households where the respondent household 
member has cancer, followed by stroke and heart diseases. Across all conditions, health 
expenditures are generally highest in the first two months of illness.  For example, for cancer 
sufferers, households spent $1,226 and $1,095, compared with $602 and $115 for stroke 
sufferers, and $377 and $227 for those with heart diseases. Cumulative household spending on 
health, over a 12 month duration from illness onset, is $3,546 (US$2555; €2283) for those with 
cancer, $1,203 (US$867; €775) for heart patients, and $1,197 (US$863; €771) for stroke 
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patients.6 Total health spending over 12 months for respondents diagnosed with any minor 
conditions (e.g. hypertension, arthritis) is considerably lower, at $130 (US$94; €84). 
5.3 Health Expenditures and Private Health Insurance 
We investigate how the availability of private health insurance influences households’ total 
health expenditures in response to a health shock. We define that an individual has private 
health insurance if he or she is reported as having an Integrated Shield Plan or wholly private 
insurance, as described in Section 2. To mitigate potential biases arising from reverse 
causation, where for instance individuals take up private health insurance after experiencing a 
health shock, we use individuals’ reported private health insurance status at baseline, and fix 
this over the entire sample period. Of course, this approach will not preclude other possible 
endogeneity issues arising from omitted variables such as individuals’ underlying health 
conditions – individuals with worse health conditions are more likely to acquire more severe 
health shocks (associated with higher spending) and, at the same time, are more likely to be 
better insured. In the presence of such adverse selection, we may observe that private insured 
individuals spend more in response to a universally defined health shock. 
The estimated incremental effect on households’ total health expenditure in response to a major 
shock are shown in Figure 3; the corresponding parameter estimates are shown in Table OA.3. 
Overall, household spending on health is higher for individuals with private health insurance 
coverage, compared with those with only MediShield Life, the publicly provided catastrophic 
health insurance. This difference is most pronounced for those with cancer, where privately 
insured households spent $1,420 and $1,240 in the first two months of illness compared with 
those without private coverage ($659 and $663). 
For privately insured households, the cumulative household spending on health, over a 12 
month duration from illness onset, is $3,368 for those with cancer, $1,358 for heart patients, 
and $1945 for stroke patients. Cumulative spending is lower for household without private 
coverage, and are $2,749, $892 and $1,271 for cancer, heart and stroke sufferers respectively. 
That expenditure on health is higher for households with private health insurance is consistent 
with the function of private health insurance in Singapore – this covers health care services 
                                                     
6  Cumulative household spending over a 12 month duration is calculated by adding the estimates of the 
incremental effects for each month 𝑡0 to 𝑡12 that are statistically significant from zero. Statistical significance is 
based on the estimated standard errors of the set of binary shock variables 𝑺𝒊𝒉𝒕 , from regression models that are 
estimated using linear fixed effects estimation. 
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from private hospitals and medical practitioners, and hospital services in public hospitals 
offering better amenities, both at a higher price.  
5.4 Robustness Checks  
Our empirical strategy hinges on the assumption that the health shocks we study are 
unanticipated. By including binary variables representing each of the two months prior to the 
onset of shocks, our test provides support that the major health shocks we study are 
unanticipated. To examine if there exists an anticipation effect for a longer duration of time 
prior to an onset of a shock, we estimate an alternative specification that includes 12 lead binary 
variables. To preserve degrees of freedom, we include only two post-shock binary variables to 
capture post-shock effects. The estimated coefficients are shown in Figures OA.2 - OA.5. 
Consistent with our baseline results, we do not find any evidence pointing to an anticipation 
effect for most outcomes analysed. An exception is the case of a minor shock on total health 
expenditures (Figure OA.5) where we find evidence of a small anticipatory effect (at time t-2), 
which is also observed in our baseline results.   
We perform three additional checks. First, we aggregate our illness and expenditure data over 
a 3-month period instead of using monthly observations and rerun the regressions where shock 
variables are binary indicators representing quarters rather than months. This analysis takes 
into account the possibility that the onset of illness may not be that frequent, and serves to 
mitigate possible measurement errors that might arise (e.g. inability of respondents to recall 
the exact timing of shocks). These results are shown in Panel A in Table A.4. The estimated 
magnitude of the quarterly effects, and their temporal patterns, are consistent with those 
obtained from our analysis on monthly data. 
Second, we use the aggregated quarterly sample to create a balanced panel to assess the effect 
of sample attrition on our estimates.7 The results from the balanced sample are reported in 
Panel B of Table A.4 and is compared with those from the unbalanced sample in Panel A of 
the same table. For the extensive margin of health expenditures, we observe slightly larger 
coefficient estimates on the quarterly binary indicators in the balanced panel compared with 
the unbalanced panel. For the intensive margin, the estimated coefficients from the balanced 
sample are slightly smaller, and the effects less temporally persistent compared with the 
unbalanced sample results. The differences in the magnitude of the effects from the unbalanced 
                                                     
7 We create a balanced panel using the aggregated quarterly sample rather than the monthly sample because doing 




and balanced samples are small and indicate that potential biases from sample attrition is likely 
to be minimal.8 
Third, we address potential biases that may occur if the onset of one type of health shock 
follows another. In the observation period, less than 3% of the respondents had reported 
suffering from both major and minor shocks in the observation period. To eliminate sequential 
effects, we restrict our sample to respondents who experienced only one type of shocks and re-
run the analysis. The results are reported in Table A.5. The estimated magnitude of the effects, 
and the temporal patterns are very similar to our baseline results.  
5.5 Health Shocks and Household Income 
We estimate the expenditure regressions in Equation (2), where the outcome variable is the 
logarithm of household income, to examine how health shocks affect the amount of income 
households generate from work. Our regression estimates are presented in Table 5. We find 
that a major health shock leads to large and statistically significant reductions in household 
income when male household members fell ill. More specifically, for males, household income 
decreases by between 18% to 23% and these reduction occurs from 5 to 11 months after the 
onset of major illness. The effects for minor illnesses, and for when female household members 
fell ill, are not statistically significant from zero. 
The effects on household income of major shocks, cancer, heart and stroke, are presented in 
Table OA.4. These estimates show that the reduction in household income is especially 
pronounced for males with stroke and cancer. Separating the analyses by major conditions, we 
observe that household income increases in the second and third months following the onset of 
cancer and stroke for females (Table OA.4). 
5.6 The Effects of Health Shocks on Non-Health Expenditures. 
What impact do health shocks have on households’ non-health expenditures and its dynamics? 
To investigate this, we estimate the expenditure regressions in Equations (1) and (2) on a 
households’ total non-health spending, and spending across 8 broad non-health categories: 
housing, utilities, food, transport, domestic services, leisure, home repairs and tobacco. The 
                                                     
8 A comprehensive investigation on the nature and consequence of attrition is beyond the scope of this paper. The 
consensus among studies that have examined this issue is that attrition does not lead to serious biases in the 
economic sense, even in the presence of statistical evidence of attrition bias, and large sample attrition. See Cheng 




expenditure items within each spending category is detailed in Table A.3. We focus our 
discussion on major health shocks – cancer and heart– which we find to have the largest 
effects.9  
Our main results are shown in Table 6 and summarised in Figure 4. Individuals with cancer 
reported a largest reduction in total non-health expenditure, from 14% to 29%. For these 
individuals, the drop in non-health spending persist for up to 5 months after onset, with 
spending levels reverting their pre-illness levels thereafter. The drop in non-health expenditure 
for individuals with a new heart diagnosis is small (~8%) in comparison to those with cancer. 
The results also indicate a significant drop in non-health spending for individuals with an onset 
of stroke.   
What accounts for the drop in non-health spending among individuals with cancer and heart 
conditions? As shown in Figure 5a, for cancer sufferers, much of the reduction in non-health 
spending is driven by a decrease in spending on leisure. More specifically, the probability of 
reporting positive expenditure on leisure decreases by 6% to 16%, with the lower spending 
persisting for up to 11 months after onset (Table OA.5). By comparison, leisure spending by 
individuals with new heart conditions remain largely unchanged, and even increased slightly.  
Individuals with a new cancer diagnosis also reported significant reductions in spending on 
tobacco which occur from the time of illness onset; lower spending levels persist for a number 
of months before increasing significantly (Figure 5b, Table OA.6). Our results also show that 
cancer suffers report large reductions in spending on home repairs (Tables OA.5, OA.6). Those 
with a new heart condition are more likely to increase spending on food (eating at home), and 
some reduction in transport spending (Tables OA.7, OA.8). Overall we find that health shocks 
affect household discretionary spending (e.g. leisure, home repairs) much more than they do 
on non-discretionary spending such as utilities and food.  
6. Changes in Medical Savings and Cash Balances 
How does the incidence of health shocks affect individuals’ medical savings account and cash 
balances? As we discussed in Section 2, the funds for health expenditures can come from 
respondents’ Medisave account or cash, or that of their spouses. The Medisave account is 
restricted in what it can pay and is principally used for hospital stays.  If the respondent is 
                                                     
9 For completeness, the results for stroke are shown in Tables OA.9 and OA.10. These are not discussed due to 
small sample sizes. 
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insured, this reduces their payment and also allows them to use a higher class of hospital ward.  
In Wave 6 and Wave 18 of the SLP survey, respondents were asked to provide information on 
their household asset balances. This included the amount of money they had in their Medisave 
accounts and the balances in their cash and checking account.   
Table 7 shows the average change in Medisave balances and cash balances of respondents 
between Wave 6 and Wave 18.  We compare respondents who had a major or minor shock 
between Wave 6 and 18, with those who had no shock. We further separate out those who were 
insured in the baseline with Integrated Plan and/or private insurance with those who did not.  
We restrict attention to those who answered at least 6 waves between wave 6 and 18.  
Looking first at the impact of shocks on Medisave balances and cash balances, we observe that 
Medisave balances rose for all respondents, with and without shocks. However, major shocks 
are associated with a smaller increase in Medisave balances although the difference is not very 
large. Those experiencing no shock experienced an increase in their Medisave balances worth 
$243 more than those who experienced a major shock.  
In the case of cash-balances, the impact of shocks seem more dramatic. Those who experienced 
a major shock depleted their cash by $8,119 compared to an increase of $3,425 of those who 
had no shock. When we disaggregate those who suffered major shocks into those who have 
private health insurance and those who do not, we see that a lot of the impact of major shocks 
on Medisave balances occur to those who are not insured, while the impact is on cash balances 
among those who were insured.  
A reason for the larger effect of insurance on cash balances could be because individuals who 
use higher class wards cannot draw on their Medisave balances for much of the cost due to 
withdrawal limits. This means that when insured people use higher class wards, they are 
required to make higher out of pocket payments, leaving their cash-balances depleted as a 
consequence. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper shows that while the dynamics of spending anything on health care is similar 
between a major and minor shock, the real difference lies in the amount of resources that is 
spent and the duration that spending lasts. Major shocks have large and persistent effects while 
minor shocks have small and mainly contemporaneous effects.  
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There is even considerable heterogeneity between the major diseases. The incremental 
spending in the 12 months following a cancer diagnosis is almost three times that following a 
heart diagnosis or stroke.  To put the average 12-month incremental cancer spending of $3,546 
into perspective, the median annual household income of those who experienced a cancer shock 
(as reported in wave 6) was $18,250 and the 75th percentile was $65,100. This suggests that the 
mean incremental costs of cancer in the first year following diagnosis is almost 20% of the 
median income. The documented level and volatility of spending induced by a health shock is 
crucial in determining the welfare of risk-averse individuals. 
We find that insured respondents spend more following a major shock than do non-insured. 
This is most striking for cancer but also exists for heart and stroke. Overall, insured households 
report roughly 20-50 percent higher incremental spending in the 12 months following the onset 
of the disease compared with uninsured patients.  These findings might suggest that insured 
individuals tend to seek more expensive medical care following the shock. Another plausible 
explanation is that there exists adverse selection in Singapore’s private health insurance market 
where individuals more likely to acquire severe health shocks tend to be better insured. 
We find that household income reduces following the onset of a major shock for male 
respondents only, but not for females. This may be because males are likely to be more attached 
to the labour force compared with females. Of respondents age 50 to 65 at the time of the 
baseline survey, males are more likely to report working for pay compared with females (63% 
versus 51%), and are also less likely to be working less than 35 hours per week (7% versus 
23%). 
We also find that non-health expenditure drops following a major shock with respondents with 
cancer reported a largest reduction in total non-health expenditure, from 14% to 29% driven 
largely by reduction in leisure spending. We also find considerably heterogeneity in the way 
that specific spending categories change with response to the health shock. For example, while 
a cancer shock leads to large and persistent reductions in leisure spending, heart disease does 
not exhibit this pattern and even shows some evidence of increased spending in some periods 
following the shock. This indicates that leisure consumption is complementary to some types 
of health and not others. Similarly, spending on smoking falls for some time after a cancer or 
heart shock, but jumps back after a year (with spending being even higher than prior to onset).  
Our findings of the heterogeneity of health shock impacts on different non-health spending 
categories are interesting because they suggest that health shocks do affect marginal utility of 
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consumption. This calls into question the standard assumptions that are used in modelling 
health shocks where the marginal rates of substitution between non-health consumption is 
assumed not to be affected by a health shock (Finkestein et al 2013). Our results suggest that 
not only do people allocate more of their budget toward health when they face a shock, they 
also redistribute their non-health spending categories. Additionally, this reallocation (reflecting 
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Figure 1: Effects of major and minor health shocks on whether report positive total health  
expenditure (top), and the logarithm of expenditures (bottom).  
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Figure 5. Effects of having cancer and heart conditions on (a) the probability of positive 
























Table 1: Diagnosis (baseline and new diagnosis) 
 









% of cases 
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sion  3,320 28.8% 895 10.9% 4,215 36.5% 
Diabetes  1,667 14.4% 414 4.2% 2,081 18.0% 
Arthritis  1,193 8.1% 819 7.7% 1,750 15.2% 
Psychiatr
ic  131 1.1% 184 1.6% 315 2.7% 
Heart 
Disease 805 7.0% 480 4.5% 1,285 11.1% 
Cancer  372 3.2% 149 1.3% 521 4.5% 







Table 2: Monthly household health expenditure by type of health care service 
Panel A: $ of Expenditure 
 
Full Sample Major Conditions Minor Conditions 
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N 
Total health spending 153.2 667.9 133916 305.6 1202.7 9220 197.5 731.7 26335 
Hospital services 43.2 447.7 132988 112.5 752.9 9136 56.1 475.2 26160 
Outpatient services 40.0 120.2 133041 62.2 152.6 9141 48.7 121.9 26194 
Prescription medications 35.8 97.9 133006 62.8 136.2 9136 51.2 115.6 26186 
Other medications 21.2 63.6 133002 31.4 77.9 9138 27.2 68.7 26183 
Home nursing 3.1 64.1 132958 5.0 73.2 9220 3.3 59.3 26147 
Panel B: % with Non-zero Expenditure 
 Full Sample Major Conditions Minor Conditions 
Total health spending 48.0% 61.4% 59.8% 
Hospital services 5.1% 12.7% 7.7% 
Outpatient services 27.2% 37.5% 35.1% 
Prescription medications 27.0% 39.5% 37.1% 
Other medications 20.1% 27.9% 26.6% 
Home nursing 0.7% 1.4% 1.1% 
Panel C: $ of Expenditure Conditional on Non-zero Expenditure 
 Full Sample Major Conditions Minor Conditions 
 Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N 
Total health spending 319.4 936.4 64239 497.7 1503.5 5661 330.5 923.1 15737 
Hospital services 854.3 1809.7 6719 964.9 2011.0 1065 733.6 1567.5 2000 
Outpatient services 147.4 193.2 36139 165.7 211.9 3431 137.3 173.5 9190 
Prescription medications 132.4 150.6 35924 159.0 177.9 3609 138.1 155.1 9713 
Other medications 102.3 105.8 27623 112.6 112.5 2545 102.1 100.5 6967 
Home nursing 421.6 622.0 970 352.7 509.3 129 302.4 486.4 287 
Notes:  The sample for the “Full sample” category refers to all respondents to the survey. Samples for “Major Conditions” and “Minor Conditions” refer to respondents who have had a new 




Table 3. Coefficient estimates of the effects of health shocks on the probability of reporting 
positive health expenditures and the logarithm of health expenditures 
Variables Probability of Positive Expenditure Log Total Health Expenditure 
 Major Shock Minor Shock Major Shock Minor Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Period 𝑡−2 -0.017 -0.002 0.009 -0.018 
 (-0.89) (-0.18) (0.10) (-0.40) 
Period 𝑡−1 0.014 0.045*** 0.071 0.098** 
 (0.62) (3.44) (0.91) (2.22) 
Period 𝑡0 0.173*** 0.204*** 0.793*** 0.195*** 
 (9.58) (18.70) (11.01) (5.72) 
Period 𝑡1 0.128*** 0.083*** 0.574*** 0.071* 
 (6.18) (6.65) (7.44) (1.84) 
Period 𝑡2 0.078*** 0.066*** 0.298*** 0.003 
 (3.75) (5.17) (3.98) (0.06) 
Period 𝑡3 0.059*** 0.052*** 0.284*** 0.068 
 (2.75) (3.97) (3.68) (1.63) 
Period 𝑡4 0.054*** 0.031** 0.212*** -0.010 
 (2.59) (2.36) (2.97) (-0.22) 
Period 𝑡5 -0.036* 0.037*** 0.108 -0.036 
 (-1.65) (2.78) (1.36) (-0.79) 
Period 𝑡6 0.004 0.028** 0.136* -0.014 
 (0.19) (2.04) (1.68) (-0.33) 
Period 𝑡7 0.040* 0.022 0.106 -0.067 
 (1.79) (1.63) (1.35) (-1.45) 
Period 𝑡8 0.016 0.009 0.047 -0.014 
 (0.75) (0.64) (0.57) (-0.28) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.009 -0.005 0.210** -0.030 
 (-0.36) (-0.34) (2.24) (-0.59) 
Period 𝑡10 0.005 0.018 -0.003 -0.015 
 (0.23) (1.36) (-0.03) (-0.32) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.033 0.011 0.187** 0.038 
 (-1.33) (0.78) (2.15) (0.81) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥 -0.017 0.002 0.143* 0.012 
 (-0.67) (0.16) (1.85) (0.23) 
Constant 0.014 0.010 5.070*** 4.916*** 
 (1.12) (1.34) (24.26) (113.26) 
N 678 1,969 638 1,853 
NxT 10,029 28,673 5,661 15,737 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis, with standard errors clustered at the level of 
the household. Models are estimated using ordinary least squares with individual fixed effects. The estimates 
show the effect on health expenditures for each time period 𝑡−2  to  𝑡12  prior to or after the shock. Model 
specification includes 18 wave dummies, whose coefficients are not shown above.  Estimates in columns (1) 
and (2) denote the change in the probability of positive health care expenditures; estimates in columns (3) and 





Table 4. Conditional incremental effects of health shocks on total health expenditures (dollars) 
 
Variables Heart Cancer Stroke Minor Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Period 𝑡−2 39.01 -64.86 -42.60 -6.08 
Period 𝑡−1 4.56 420.60*** 82.46 34.46** 
Period 𝑡0 377.10*** 1,226.23*** 601.53*** 70.76*** 
Period 𝑡1 227.13*** 1,094.62*** 115.28 24.40* 
Period 𝑡2 138.98* 430.51** 39.91 0.83 
Period 𝑡3 76.18** 476.11** 225.29* 23.62 
Period 𝑡4 77.16 318.76** 41.76 -3.24 
Period 𝑡5 58.98 28.82 97.36 -11.84 
Period 𝑡6 93.40** 51.01 -118.78 -4.71 
Period 𝑡7 51.16 90.36 -25.80 -21.80 
Period 𝑡8 25.54 36.00 46.68 -4.62 
Period 𝑡9 107.46** -33.83 269.27 -9.78 
Period 𝑡10 -13.70 5.67 228.81 -4.89 
Period 𝑡11 95.58** 26.20 370.12* 13.05 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥 87.13** 8.70 51.08 3.93 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reported statistical significance is based on the estimated standard errors 
of the set of binary shock variables 𝑺𝒊𝒉𝒕 , from regression models that are estimated using linear fixed effects 
estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the household. Incremental effects are interpreted as the 
average change in total health expenditures from a 0 to 1 in the health shock explanatory variable 𝑺𝒊𝒋𝒕 for each 




Table 5. Health shocks on the logarithm of total household income from work,  
by gender of respondent 
 Major Minor 
 Male Female Male Female 
Period 𝑡−2 -0.054 -0.042 -0.081 0.030 
 (-0.56) (-0.30) (-1.23) (0.38) 
Period 𝑡−1 -0.021 0.033 -0.193** 0.035 
 (-0.22) (0.33) (-2.45) (0.62) 
Period 𝑡0 -0.083 -0.013 0.051 0.027 
 (-0.84) (-0.16) (0.76) (0.50) 
Period 𝑡1 -0.090 -0.099 -0.018 0.011 
 (-1.20) (-0.89) (-0.30) (0.18) 
Period 𝑡2 -0.040 -0.067 -0.004 -0.008 
 (-0.43) (-0.70) (-0.06) (-0.13) 
Period 𝑡3 -0.130 0.120 -0.048 0.040 
 (-1.20) (1.35) (-0.72) (0.56) 
Period 𝑡4 -0.039 -0.040 -0.075 0.005 
 (-0.38) (-0.37) (-1.42) (0.09) 
Period 𝑡5 -0.175* -0.101 -0.014 0.062 
 (-1.75) (-0.91) (-0.20) (1.07) 
Period 𝑡6 -0.096 -0.014 -0.036 0.018 
 (-0.95) (-0.18) (-0.58) (0.36) 
Period 𝑡7 -0.113 -0.095 0.024 -0.020 
 (-1.18) (-1.02) (0.46) (-0.34) 
Period 𝑡8 -0.229*** -0.156 0.006 -0.050 
 (-2.62) (-1.55) (0.09) (-0.95) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.189* 0.057 0.032 0.060 
 (-1.72) (0.46) (0.52) (1.04) 
Period 𝑡10 -0.197* -0.101 -0.070 -0.072 
 (-1.74) (-0.97) (-1.09) (-1.39) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.185 -0.175 0.070 -0.008 
 (-1.63) (-1.17) (1.00) (-0.15) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥 -0.079 -0.016 -0.093** -0.018 
 (-0.72) (-0.18) (-1.97) (-0.32) 
Constant 7.291*** 6.958*** 7.204*** 7.033*** 
 (70.92) (52.44) (98.87) (94.00) 
N 216 196 507 596 
NxT 1,572 1,347 3,256 3,867 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis, with standard errors clustered at the level of 
the household.  Models are estimated using linear fixed effects estimation on the logarithm of total household 





Table 6. Coefficient estimates of the effects of health shocks on the  
logarithm of total non-health expenditures 
 Cancer Heart Stroke 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Period 𝑡−2 -0.100 0.029 -0.131 
 (-1.43) (0.82) (-1.13) 
Period 𝑡−1 -0.092 -0.024 0.080 
 (-1.38) (-0.67) (0.80) 
Period 𝑡0 -0.083 0.056 0.068 
 (-1.31) (1.61) (0.81) 
Period 𝑡1 -0.083 -0.006 -0.043 
 (-1.36) (-0.18) (-0.46) 
Period 𝑡2 -0.208*** 0.007 -0.073 
 (-3.41) (0.20) (-0.77) 
Period 𝑡3 -0.081 -0.023 -0.081 
 (-1.19) (-0.64) (-0.74) 
Period 𝑡4 -0.140** -0.010 -0.222** 
 (-2.00) (-0.24) (-2.19) 
Period 𝑡5 -0.286*** -0.080** -0.072 
 (-3.91) (-2.14) (-0.70) 
Period 𝑡6 -0.067 -0.029 0.029 
 (-1.17) (-0.75) (0.32) 
Period 𝑡7 -0.100 -0.044 0.011 
 (-1.51) (-1.11) (0.11) 
Period 𝑡8 -0.043 -0.057 0.074 
 (-0.62) (-1.30) (0.63) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.011 -0.077** -0.131 
 (-0.13) (-1.98) (-0.99) 
Period 𝑡10 -0.027 -0.059 -0.076 
 (-0.41) (-1.47) (-0.76) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.026 -0.031 -0.129 
 (-0.38) (-0.71) (-1.00) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥 -0.069 -0.023 -0.178 
 (-0.84) (-0.50) (-1.52) 
Constant 7.779*** 7.937*** 7.572*** 
 (93.31) (83.49) (76.91) 
N 146 477 93 
NxT 1,961 6,385 1,247 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis. Models are estimated using linear fixed 
effects estimation on the logarithm of non-health expenditures in a given month. Total non-health 
expenditures are calculated as a sum of expenditure across spending categories such as housing cost, food, 
utilities, transport, domestic, home repairs, tobacco and leisure. Estimates denote the change in the logarithm 
of total health expenditures in month in 𝑡0 which the shock occurs, and 𝑡 ± 𝑚 for m months prior to or after 












Table 7. Changes in Medisave and cash balances 
 
 Medisave Cash 
 
Balances in  
Wave 6 (Median ) 
Average Change in 
Balances (w18-w6) 
Balances in  
Wave 6 (Median ) 
Average Change in 
Balances (w18-w6) 
No shock (n=5905) $20,000 $1,488 $ 45,969 $3,425 
Minor Shock (n=669) $10,000 $1,335 $45,000 $4,332 
Major Shock (n=252) $12,000 $1,245 $44,877 $-8,119 
Major Shock and Uninsured (n=86) $ 5,000 $-869 $38,873 $-5,356 





Table A.1: Sample size and waves (Respondents aged 50-70 and corresponding households) 
 
Wave Respondents Households 
0 11,536 8,725 
1 873 620 
2 7,317 5,449 
3 7,205 5,342 
4 7,462 5,481 
5 7,878 5,781 
6 8,680 6,476 
7 7,253 5,310 
8 7,265 5,287 
9 7,526 5,506 
10 7,482 5,457 
11 7,531 5,499 
12 7,790 5,703 
13 7,457 5,431 
14 7,435 5,415 
15 7,486 5,440 
16 7,196 5,205 
17 7,608 5,523 
18 7,782 5,689 
19 7,400 5,385 
Notes: Wave 0 is the baseline survey which was in the field from May to July 2015. Wave 1 is a pilot survey 










 Exemplars/details offered to respondents in the SLP Survey  
Hospital Services 
Out-of-pocket cost and costs paid from Medisave for hospital and 
nursing home care 
Outpatient Services 
Out-of-pocket cost and costs paid from Medisave of visits to 
doctors, traditional physicians (e.g. traditional Chinese physicians), 
physiotherapists, and psychologists; eye care and dental service 
fees; lab tests. 
Prescription Medications 
Prescription medications: out-of-pocket cost and anything paid 
from Medisave for prescription 
Other Medications 
out-of-pocket cost and anything paid from Medisave for traditional 
medicines (e.g. Chinese medicine, Ayurvedic, etc.),  over-the-
counter medications, other medical products (e.g. wheelchair,| 
crutches) and therapeutic equipment 
Home Nursing 
Home nursing: hiring costs of a helper due to health problems (do 
not include domestic services by a maid here) 
Health Insurance None. 
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Table A.3: Non-health Spending Categories 
 
Broad Category Expenditure categories 
Housing Mortgage; Property tax, Home and content insurance; Rent. 
Utilities Utilities and other fuels; Communication 
Food Food and beverages 
Transport 
Road use fees; Vehicle insurance; Petrol; Vehicle Repair and 
maintenance; Public transport 
Domestic Services Domestic and housekeeping 
Leisure   
Dining and/or drinking out; Entertainment; Sports; Hobbies and 
leisure equipment; package tours and vacation. 





Table A.4. Robustness check using a sample where monthly observations are aggregated over a 
3-month period  
Variables Probability of Positive Expenditure Log Total Health Expenditure 
 Major Shock Minor Shock Major Shock Minor Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Unbalanced Sample 
Period 𝑡min (−9)−(−7) -0.023 0.001 -0.013 -0.029 
 (-1.34) (0.10) (-0.23) (-0.93) 
Period 𝑡(−6)−(−4) -0.018 0.003 0.046 -0.120** 
 (-0.95) (0.29) (0.70) (-2.57) 
Period 𝑡(−3)−(−1) -0.005 0.012 0.050 -0.030 
 (-0.25) (1.15) (0.75) (-0.77) 
Period 𝑡0−2 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.610*** 0.060* 
 (7.00) (12.13) (9.31) (1.72) 
Period 𝑡3−5 0.023 0.043*** 0.241*** -0.029 
 (1.28) (3.87) (3.64) (-0.76) 
Period 𝑡6−8 0.017 0.023** 0.131* -0.066* 
 (0.96) (2.05) (1.92) (-1.72) 
Period 𝑡9−𝑚𝑎𝑥 0.003 0.009 0.174** -0.007 
 (0.16) (0.79) (2.41) (-0.17) 
Panel B:  Balanced Sample 
Period 𝑡min (−9)−(−7) 0.017 -0.002 -0.209* 0.027 
 (0.54) (-0.14) (-1.91) (0.45) 
Period 𝑡(−6)−(−4) 0.010 -0.010 -0.187 -0.232** 
 (0.23) (-0.42) (-0.97) (-2.19) 
Period 𝑡(−3)−(−1) 0.035 0.010 -0.236 -0.095 
 (0.70) (0.37) (-1.20) (-0.96) 
Period 𝑡0−2 0.169*** 0.135*** 0.451** -0.008 
 (3.11) (4.56) (2.12) (-0.08) 
Period 𝑡3−5 0.076 0.063** 0.075 -0.090 
 (1.43) (2.03) (0.40) (-0.91) 
Period 𝑡6−8 0.067 0.021 -0.052 -0.088 
 (1.46) (0.74) (-0.32) (-0.98) 
Period 𝑡9−𝑚𝑎𝑥 0.007 0.003 0.232 -0.113 
 (0.16) (0.11) (1.50) (-1.30) 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis, with standard errors clustered at the level of 
the household. Models are estimated using ordinary least squares with individual fixed effects. The estimates 
show the effect on health expenditures for each time period 𝑡−2 to 𝑡12 prior to or after the shock. Estimates in 
columns (1) and (2) denote the change in the probability of positive health care expenditures; estimates in 





Table A.5. Robustness check: sample of respondents with only one health shock. 
 
Variables Probability of Positive Expenditure Log Total Health Expenditure 
 Major Shock Minor Shock Major Shock Minor Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Period 𝑡−2 -0.007 0.002 -0.118 -0.023 
 (-0.27) (0.14) (-1.03) (-0.48) 
Period 𝑡−1 0.045 0.050*** 0.137 0.070 
 (1.57) (3.63) (1.30) (1.50) 
Period 𝑡0 0.186*** 0.210*** 0.878*** 0.200*** 
 (7.86) (17.72) (8.78) (5.51) 
Period 𝑡1 0.148*** 0.088*** 0.670*** 0.061 
 (5.32) (6.38) (6.08) (1.47) 
Period 𝑡2 0.092*** 0.072*** 0.340*** 0.002 
 (3.25) (5.19) (3.37) (0.04) 
Period 𝑡3 0.070** 0.053*** 0.235** 0.046 
 (2.48) (3.72) (2.25) (1.05) 
Period 𝑡4 0.079*** 0.037*** 0.191** -0.012 
 (2.85) (2.59) (1.97) (-0.26) 
Period 𝑡5 -0.025 0.045*** 0.120 -0.041 
 (-0.85) (3.13) (1.06) (-0.85) 
Period 𝑡6 0.004 0.028* 0.053 -0.038 
 (0.13) (1.85) (0.48) (-0.82) 
Period 𝑡7 0.038 0.024 0.025 -0.100** 
 (1.24) (1.59) (0.24) (-1.99) 
Period 𝑡8 0.022 0.011 -0.029 -0.046 
 (0.73) (0.76) (-0.24) (-0.90) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.013 -0.0004 0.164 -0.090* 
 (-0.38) (-0.02) (1.30) (-1.75) 
Period 𝑡10 0.024 0.015 0.061 -0.008 
 (0.77) (1.04) (0.56) (-0.17) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.044 0.009 0.214* 0.044 
 (-1.26) (0.55) (1.69) (0.85) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥 -0.046 -0.001 0.171 -0.009 
 (-1.34) (-0.05) (1.47) (-0.16) 
Constant 0.009 0.009 4.991*** 4.858*** 
 (0.56) (1.07) (20.27) (105.32) 
N 387 1,678 364 1,579 
NxT 5,621 24,265 3,122 13,198 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis, with standard errors clustered at the 
level of the household. Models are estimated using ordinary least squares with individual fixed effects. 
The estimates show the effect on health expenditures for each time period 𝑡−2 to 𝑡12 prior to or after 
the shock. Model specification includes 18 wave dummies, whose coefficients are not shown above.  
Estimates in columns (1) and (2) denote the change in the probability of positive health care 







Figure OA.1: Monthly Household Expenditure Amongst Employed Residents aged 50 – 70 (: Wave 1- 4 of SLP 
and Singapore Household and Expenditure Survey) 
Notes: Singstat data taken from the Report on the Household Expenditure Survey from 2012/13, Table 5 “Households 
by Monthly Household Income and Working Status/ Occupation of Main Income Earner (excluding imputed rental of 
owner-occupied accommodation)”. Employed persons is defined as work for one hour or more either for pay, profit or 
family gains; or (ii) have a job or business to return to but are temporarily absent because of illness, injury, breakdown 
of machinery at workplace, labour management dispute or other reasons.) SLP: Employed defined as answering the 
question “What is your current employment situation?” with Working for pay or Self-employed. Spending variables 

































































































Table OA.1 Coefficient estimates of the effects of health shocks on the probability of reporting positive health expenditures, by types of health care 
 
 Major Conditions Minor Conditions 
 Hospital Outpatient Prescription Other Meds Home Nursing Hospital Outpatient Prescription Other Meds Home Nursing 
Period 𝑡−2 0.0000 0.023 -0.004 -0.012 -0.003 0.007 0.005 -0.014 0.007 0.005 
 (0.00) (1.19) (-0.19) (-0.70) (-0.56) (0.93) (0.41) (-1.23) (0.64) (1.64) 
Period 𝑡−1 0.038*** 0.003 0.036 -0.007 -0.002 0.009 0.041*** 0.006 0.018 -0.006*** 
 (2.59) (0.16) (1.54) (-0.34) (-0.42) (1.13) (3.04) (0.50) (1.45) (-2.82) 
Period 𝑡0 0.200*** 0.141*** 0.154*** 0.028 0.005 0.043*** 0.160*** 0.148*** 0.067*** 0.002 
 (10.92) (6.95) (7.77) (1.50) (0.91) (5.29) (13.33) (12.56) (6.12) (0.72) 
Period 𝑡1 0.124*** 0.117*** 0.073*** 0.035* 0.005 0.012 0.076*** 0.065*** 0.028** 0.0002 
 (6.39) (5.35) (3.40) (1.81) (0.85) (1.58) (5.94) (5.18) (2.33) (0.08) 
Period 𝑡2 0.078*** 0.056*** 0.074*** 0.032* 0.006 0.003 0.059*** 0.036*** 0.014 -0.002 
 (4.75) (2.67) (3.55) (1.71) (1.13) (0.34) (4.62) (2.86) (1.22) (-0.68) 
Period 𝑡3 0.051*** 0.075*** 0.034 -0.018 0.005 0.004 0.041*** 0.027** 0.005 0.001 
 (3.26) (3.34) (1.59) (-0.97) (0.80) (0.47) (3.17) (2.19) (0.43) (0.20) 
Period 𝑡4 0.060*** 0.065*** -0.003 0.005 0.001 -0.011 0.029** 0.022* 0.011 -0.002 
 (3.62) (2.89) (-0.16) (0.25) (0.20) (-1.55) (2.30) (1.67) (0.95) (-0.63) 
Period 𝑡5 0.032** -0.012 0.001 -0.042** -0.003 -0.004 0.039*** 0.017 0.008 -0.001 
 (2.05) (-0.53) (0.06) (-2.33) (-0.65) (-0.43) (3.05) (1.33) (0.65) (-0.34) 
Period 𝑡6 0.040*** 0.006 0.047** -0.004 0.007 0.004 0.017 0.013 0.003 -0.001 
 (2.62) (0.24) (2.12) (-0.25) (1.02) (0.46) (1.29) (0.99) (0.20) (-0.28) 
Period 𝑡7 0.037** 0.017 0.060*** 0.010 0.001 -0.003 0.015 0.018 0.010 0.004 
 (2.24) (0.72) (2.61) (0.50) (0.19) (-0.34) (1.12) (1.35) (0.82) (1.29) 
Period 𝑡8 0.021 0.011 0.026 -0.027 -0.003 -0.006 0.008 0.016 0.009 -0.0002 
 (1.29) (0.47) (1.11) (-1.35) (-0.43) (-0.68) (0.59) (1.22) (0.74) (-0.05) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.004 0.043* -0.011 0.043** 0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.016 0.020 0.002 
 (-0.22) (1.77) (-0.46) (1.97) (0.63) (-0.45) (-0.62) (-1.24) (1.61) (0.45) 
Period 𝑡10 0.009 0.028 -0.011 0.044* 0.004 -0.006 0.017 0.010 0.028** -0.001 
 (0.53) (1.20) (-0.47) (1.87) (0.61) (-0.66) (1.17) (0.70) (2.09) (-0.33) 
Period 𝑡11 0.021 0.029 -0.005 -0.023 0.008 -0.012 -0.007 0.002 0.017 0.002 
 (1.23) (1.04) (-0.19) (-1.02) (0.95) (-1.37) (-0.46) (0.16) (1.29) (0.54) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥  0.017 0.031 0.015 0.012 0.007 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 0.011 0.001 
 (1.07) (1.16) (0.62) (0.50) (1.00) (-0.36) (-0.09) (-0.39) (0.82) (0.30) 
Constant 0.0002 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.010 0.001 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.03) (0.56) (0.28) (0.44) (0.58) (-0.92) (1.44) (0.16) (0.39) (-0.59) 
N 678 678 678 678 678 1,969 1,969 1,969 1,969 1,969 
NxT 10,029 10,029 10,029 10,029 10,029 28,673 28,673 28,673 28,673 28,673 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis, with standard errors clustered at the level of the household. Models are estimated using fixed effects linear probability 




Table OA.2 Coefficient estimates of the effects of health shocks on the logarithm of health expenditures, by types of health care 
 
 Major Conditions Minor Conditions 
 Hospital Outpatient Prescription Other Meds Home Nursing Hospital Outpatient Prescription Other Meds Home Nursing 
Period 𝑡−2 -0.268 0.107 -0.006 -0.006 0.471 0.101 -0.070 -0.005 -0.042 0.314 
 (-0.75) (1.17) (-0.07) (-0.07) (0.75) (0.50) (-1.32) (-0.10) (-0.79) (0.84) 
Period 𝑡−1 0.106 0.145 0.029 -0.064 0.398 0.256 0.088 0.041 -0.050 -0.461** 
 (0.47) (1.63) (0.41) (-0.79) (0.61) (1.41) (1.60) (0.96) (-1.05) (-2.38) 
Period 𝑡0 0.885*** 0.351*** 0.203*** 0.022 0.162 -0.104 0.101*** 0.039 0.052 -0.319 
 (4.82) (5.02) (3.48) (0.29) (0.25) (-0.68) (2.76) (1.20) (1.29) (-0.98) 
Period 𝑡1 0.657*** 0.273*** 0.227*** 0.048 0.448 -0.369** 0.040 -0.016 -0.013 -0.463 
 (3.05) (3.68) (3.55) (0.65) (0.81) (-2.29) (0.97) (-0.44) (-0.27) (-1.12) 
Period 𝑡2 0.281 0.115 0.177** 0.059 -0.154 -0.199 0.010 -0.009 -0.060 0.137 
 (1.17) (1.49) (2.46) (0.78) (-0.27) (-0.99) (0.23) (-0.22) (-1.27) (0.33) 
Period 𝑡3 0.399 0.263*** 0.035 0.037 -0.018 -0.218 0.145*** 0.009 -0.083* 0.089 
 (1.63) (3.11) (0.50) (0.42) (-0.03) (-1.19) (2.91) (0.22) (-1.68) (0.31) 
Period 𝑡4 0.133 0.087 0.099 0.020 -0.576 -0.239 -0.021 0.025 -0.030 0.141 
 (0.61) (1.08) (1.22) (0.26) (-1.35) (-1.08) (-0.40) (0.60) (-0.65) (0.43) 
Period 𝑡5 -0.122 0.055 0.036 -0.117 -0.486 -0.037 -0.029 -0.071* -0.052 0.722*** 
 (-0.61) (0.58) (0.47) (-1.35) (-0.87) (-0.17) (-0.55) (-1.65) (-1.07) (2.65) 
Period 𝑡6 -0.306 0.114 0.022 0.001 0.259 -0.215 -0.016 0.008 -0.018 -0.150 
 (-1.18) (1.34) (0.31) (0.01) (0.46) (-1.05) (-0.30) (0.19) (-0.35) (-0.43) 
Period 𝑡7 0.271 0.063 0.024 -0.060 0.803 -0.277 -0.036 -0.013 -0.068 -0.078 
 (1.16) (0.72) (0.32) (-0.69) (1.21) (-1.42) (-0.68) (-0.29) (-1.24) (-0.19) 
Period 𝑡8 0.281 0.026 0.031 -0.072 0.788 -0.030 -0.023 0.022 -0.091* 0.252 
 (1.09) (0.32) (0.42) (-0.82) (1.27) (-0.13) (-0.44) (0.46) (-1.72) (0.65) 
Period 𝑡9 0.172 0.051 0.154* 0.016 0.434 -0.442** 0.095 0.034 -0.012 0.760 
 (0.52) (0.53) (1.82) (0.18) (0.72) (-1.97) (1.60) (0.70) (-0.25) (1.61) 
Period 𝑡10 -0.153 -0.005 0.020 -0.019 0.041 -0.280 -0.048 -0.019 -0.079 0.473 
 (-0.55) (-0.06) (0.25) (-0.22) (0.07) (-1.33) (-0.86) (-0.40) (-1.42) (1.23) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.217 0.041 0.004 -0.099 0.260 0.115 0.091* 0.058 -0.002 0.563 
 (-0.72) (0.45) (0.05) (-1.08) (0.85) (0.58) (1.70) (1.21) (-0.04) (1.49) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥  0.023 0.055 0.256*** -0.025 -0.407 0.059 0.121* -0.015 -0.072 0.497 
 (0.10) (0.62) (3.00) (-0.28) (-1.35) (0.30) (1.94) (-0.30) (-1.22) (1.17) 
Constant 5.518*** 4.430*** 4.335*** 4.342*** 5.704*** 5.615*** 4.458*** 4.667*** 4.177*** 4.966*** 
 (22.35) (64.83) (64.53) (60.49) (12.65) (11.98) (38.53) (44.96) (91.07) (8.44) 
N 392 578 586 513 62 831 1,626 1,679 1,452 128 
NxT 1,065 3,431 3,609 2,545 129 2,000 9,190 9,713 6,967 287 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis, with standard errors clustered at the level of the household. Models are estimated using fixed effects ordinary least squares 




Table OA.3. Conditional incremental effects of major health shocks on total health expenditures by private health insurance status 
 
 Heart Cancer Stroke 
Variables 
Private Health 
Insurance = Yes 
Private Health 
Insurance = No 
Private Health 
Insurance = Yes 
Private Health 
Insurance = No 
Private Health 
Insurance = Yes 
Private Health 
Insurance = No 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Period 𝑡−2 -2.64 123.08 -124.33 -118.21 -72.38 -36.50 
Period 𝑡−1 -43.68 97.39 381.40** 345.66 206.16 -115.23 
Period 𝑡0 401.17*** 331.58*** 1420.13*** 659.01*** 610.18*** 547.72*** 
Period 𝑡1 232.14*** 212.20*** 1240.36*** 662.71** 96.37 151.12 
Period 𝑡2 160.83*** 110.58** 192.48 781.13** 43.54 42.92 
Period 𝑡3 67.11 97.51 407.09* 390.72 205.50 325.47* 
Period 𝑡4 111.43** 6.91 300.23* 183.12 7.45 86.34 
Period 𝑡5 66.44 42.21 -142.69 645.90** 96.31 117.53 
Period 𝑡6 115.02* 63.97 9.36 46.19 -195.98 -51.16 
Period 𝑡7 50.95 49.98 49.57 137.28 86.97 -87.43 
Period 𝑡8 46.63 -8.06 77.04 -51.61 8.03 38.06 
Period 𝑡9 164.27** 1.87 -8.86 -95.57 331.28 130.48 
Period 𝑡10 -77.52 119.84** -105.18 108.59 -126.16 397.99* 
Period 𝑡11 172.88*** -24.65 -118.64 105.85 1334.86*** 106.58 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥  76.42 117.71* 23.61 -103.43 -71.40 154.80 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reported statistical significance is based on the estimated standard errors of the set of binary shock variables 𝑆𝒊𝒉𝒕 , from regression models that are 
estimated using linear fixed effects estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the household. Incremental effects are interpreted as the average change in total health 
expenditures from a 0 to 1 in the health shock explanatory variable 𝑺𝒊𝒉𝒕 for each time period 𝑡−2 to 𝑡12. Predictions of log expenditures are transformed into level expenditures using the Duan 
smearing estimator. Private health insurance is defined as the availability of Integrated Plans or wholly private health insurance; individuals without private health insurance are covered 




Table OA.4. Effect of having major shocks on the logarithm of household income from work, by gender of 
respondent. 
 
 Cancer Heart Stroke 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Period 𝑡−2 0.272 0.177 -0.101 -0.080 0.066 -0.268 
 (1.04) (0.57) (-0.97) (-0.47) (0.41) (-1.00) 
Period 𝑡−1 -0.253 0.226 0.061 -0.042 0.193 0.211** 
 (-1.12) (1.42) (0.66) (-0.33) (0.66) (2.10) 
Period 𝑡0 -0.290 -0.041 -0.120 -0.010 0.357 -0.037 
 (-1.42) (-0.22) (-1.52) (-0.10) (0.72) (-0.15) 
Period 𝑡1 -0.092 -0.069 -0.025 -0.130 0.142 0.078 
 (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.29) (-0.89) (0.65) (0.39) 
Period 𝑡2 -0.087 0.546** -0.014 -0.199* -0.417* 0.021 
 (-0.41) (2.20) (-0.13) (-1.78) (-1.67) (0.11) 
Period 𝑡3 -0.037 0.136 -0.113 0.102 -0.569 0.281** 
 (-0.13) (1.17) (-1.07) (0.81) (-1.35) (2.16) 
Period 𝑡4 -0.268 0.319 0.082 -0.124 -0.278 0.108 
 (-1.58) (1.65) (0.70) (-0.87) (-0.68) (0.45) 
Period 𝑡5 -0.172 0.123 -0.119 -0.156 -0.152 0.014 
 (-0.69) (0.66) (-1.24) (-1.10) (-0.34) (0.07) 
Period 𝑡6 -0.152 0.159 -0.035 -0.047 -0.045 0.008 
 (-0.64) (1.17) (-0.38) (-0.52) (-0.07) (0.04) 
Period 𝑡7 -0.104 -0.014 -0.035 -0.154 -0.341 0.390 
 (-0.44) (-0.11) (-0.35) (-1.29) (-1.56) (1.64) 
Period 𝑡8 -0.146 -0.010 -0.198* -0.237* -0.072 0.192 
 (-1.06) (-0.10) (-1.91) (-1.65) (-0.30) (0.55) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.295* 0.018 -0.107 0.094 0.217 0.034 
 (-1.67) (0.18) (-0.84) (0.59) (0.73) (0.23) 
Period 𝑡10 -0.068 0.124 -0.166 -0.161 -0.463** 0.058 
 (-0.59) (1.23) (-1.24) (-1.09) (-2.42) (0.44) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.237 -0.403 -0.144 -0.076 0.223 -0.109 
 (-1.04) (-0.75) (-1.18) (-0.67) (0.71) (-0.55) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥  -0.233 0.035 0.013 -0.002 -0.741** -0.042 
 (-1.24) (0.28) (0.10) (-0.01) (-2.11) (-0.27) 
Constant 7.261*** 6.959*** 7.292*** 6.963*** 7.280*** 6.947*** 
 (69.63) (48.54) (70.19) (53.62) (68.51) (47.91) 
N 216 196 216 196 216 196 
NxT 1,572 1,347 1,572 1,347 1,572 1,347 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis, with standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 














Period 𝑡−2 0.0004 -0.068* 0.002 -0.028 0.038 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.006 0.005 
 (0.03) (-1.95) (0.09) (-0.92) (1.47) (-0.07) (-0.01) (-0.18) (0.29) 
Period 𝑡−1 0.003 -0.014 -0.001 -0.011 0.011 0.040 -0.025 0.017 0.014 
 (0.15) (-0.37) (-0.05) (-0.35) (0.39) (1.07) (-0.81) (0.39) (0.63) 
Period 𝑡0 -0.012 -0.025 -0.057** -0.010 -0.006 -0.014 -0.044 0.021 -0.002 
 (-0.68) (-0.76) (-2.08) (-0.39) (-0.21) (-0.54) (-1.26) (0.55) (-0.14) 
Period 𝑡1 -0.017 -0.040 -0.061* -0.027 0.006 -0.010 -0.069* 0.027 0.016 
 (-0.86) (-1.35) (-1.84) (-0.94) (0.20) (-0.29) (-1.89) (0.70) (0.93) 
Period 𝑡2 0.016 0.001 0.022 -0.052* 0.005 -0.006 -0.072** 0.030 -0.004 
 (1.06) (0.03) (0.86) (-1.74) (0.15) (-0.22) (-2.46) (0.73) (-0.23) 
Period 𝑡3 -0.027 -0.004 -0.015 -0.058* -0.021 -0.019 -0.112*** 0.019 0.037* 
 (-1.27) (-0.13) (-0.58) (-1.70) (-0.55) (-0.58) (-2.93) (0.52) (1.69) 
Period 𝑡4 -0.011 -0.021 -0.053** -0.037 0.018 -0.028 -0.074* -0.066** -0.003 
 (-0.50) (-0.73) (-1.99) (-1.14) (0.46) (-1.03) (-1.85) (-2.00) (-0.19) 
Period 𝑡5 -0.039 -0.081** -0.089*** -0.091** -0.034 -0.031 -0.160*** -0.047 0.006 
 (-1.62) (-2.24) (-2.62) (-2.10) (-0.76) (-0.90) (-3.63) (-1.38) (0.42) 
Period 𝑡6 -0.039 -0.001 -0.017 -0.031 0.005 -0.053* -0.097** 0.009 -0.010 
 (-1.61) (-0.01) (-0.61) (-0.97) (0.14) (-1.66) (-2.37) (0.23) (-0.61) 
Period 𝑡7 -0.046* -0.036 -0.074** -0.060 0.015 0.037 -0.068 -0.075* 0.014 
 (-1.79) (-1.23) (-2.14) (-1.64) (0.36) (0.99) (-1.59) (-1.93) (0.69) 
Period 𝑡8 -0.044* -0.035 -0.062* -0.023 0.034 -0.009 -0.102** -0.028 -0.019 
 (-1.92) (-0.85) (-1.88) (-0.67) (0.89) (-0.25) (-2.54) (-0.63) (-1.20) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.033* -0.007 -0.015 -0.017 0.003 0.012 -0.027 -0.078* -0.003 
 (-1.86) (-0.22) (-0.76) (-0.66) (0.10) (0.36) (-0.68) (-1.82) (-0.12) 
Period 𝑡10 -0.039 0.016 -0.030 -0.030 0.007 -0.032 -0.022 -0.047 -0.006 
 (-1.43) (0.43) (-1.03) (-0.82) (0.16) (-0.77) (-0.55) (-1.11) (-0.36) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.038 -0.013 -0.038 -0.010 0.007 -0.031 -0.064* -0.008 -0.014 
 (-1.44) (-0.33) (-1.26) (-0.27) (0.18) (-0.76) (-1.76) (-0.18) (-0.99) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥 -0.002 -0.004 0.025 -0.028 0.033 0.005 0.005 0.025 -0.003 
 (-0.16) (0.84) (0.84) (-0.76) (1.07) (0.11) (0.15) (0.54) (-0.21) 
Constant 0.018 0.028 0.020 0.025 0.013 -0.001 0.021 0.007 -0.015 
 (1.57) (0.84) (1.12) (1.61) (0.69) (-0.04) (0.88) (0.31) (-0.79) 
N 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
NxT 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,181 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis. Models are estimated using linear fixed effects estimation on 
whether individuals have positive non-health expenditure for each time period 𝑡−2 to 𝑡12 prior to or after the shock. Expenditure 
items in broad categories include: Leisure – dining and/or drinking out, entertainment, sports, hobbies and leisure equipment, 
package tours and vacation. Housing cost – mortgage, property tax, home and content insurance, rent. Utilities – utilities and 
other fuels, communication. Transport – road use fees, vehicle insurance, petrol, vehicle repair and maintenance, public 













Period 𝑡−2 -0.099 -0.292* 0.010 -0.087 -0.177 -0.004 0.010 -0.039 -0.013 
 (-1.43) (-1.81) (0.19) (-1.12) (-1.54) (-0.03) (0.19) (-0.20) (-0.09) 
Period 𝑡−1 -0.092 -0.250* -0.014 -0.158** -0.0202 0.005 -0.014 -0.067 0.177 
 (-1.38) (-1.74) (-0.31) (-2.05) (-0.22) (0.03) (-0.31) (-0.27) (1.14) 
Period 𝑡0 -0.083 -0.010 0.008 0.002 -0.0612 -0.047 0.008 -0.479** -0.281* 
 (-1.31) (-0.07) (0.23) (0.02) (-0.71) (-0.36) (0.23) (-2.07) (-1.95) 
Period 𝑡1 -0.083 -0.185 0.001 -0.141* -0.0738 -0.192 0.001 -0.269 -0.408 
 (-1.36) (-1.25) (0.03) (-1.94) (-0.81) (-1.63) (0.03) (-1.33) (-1.53) 
Period 𝑡2 -0.208*** -0.049 -0.002 -0.018 -0.0761 0.004 -0.002 -0.456** -0.363* 
 (-3.41) (-0.36) (-0.04) (-0.26) (-0.83) (0.03) (-0.04) (-2.04) (-1.87) 
Period 𝑡3 -0.081 -0.007 0.013 -0.078 -0.1195 0.010 0.013 -0.397** -0.341 
 (-1.19) (-0.05) (0.29) (-1.08) (-1.36) (0.10) (0.29) (-2.03) (-1.43) 
Period 𝑡4 -0.140** -0.001 0.016 0.052 -0.1367 0.035 0.016 -0.024 -0.241** 
 (-2.00) (-0.00) (0.35) (0.77) (-1.23) (0.39) (0.35) (-0.09) (-2.53) 
Period 𝑡5 -0.286*** 0.320* -0.080 -0.065 -0.1305 0.089 -0.080 -0.619** -0.128 
 (-3.91) (1.87) (-1.40) (-0.96) (-1.56) (0.97) (-1.40) (-2.17) (-0.77) 
Period 𝑡6 -0.067 0.149 0.072 -0.075 -0.0588 -0.051 0.072 -0.549* -0.127 
 (-1.17) (1.03) (1.51) (-0.93) (-0.74) (-0.34) (1.51) (-1.74) (-1.05) 
Period 𝑡7 -0.100 0.027 0.032 -0.077 -0.0047 0.038 0.032 -0.243 -0.196 
 (-1.51) (0.20) (0.72) (-0.96) (-0.06) (0.36) (0.72) (-0.80) (-0.90) 
Period 𝑡8 -0.043 0.116 0.020 -0.010 0.1417 -0.379* 0.020 -0.518* -0.060 
 (-0.62) (0.69) (0.46) (-0.18) (1.63) (-1.68) (0.46) (-1.77) (-0.42) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.011 -0.148 0.025 -0.049 -0.0192 0.020 0.025 -0.230 -0.128 
 (-0.13) (-0.92) (0.47) (-0.64) (-0.24) (0.10) (0.47) (-0.67) (-0.70) 
Period 𝑡10 -0.027 -0.033 0.009 -0.129 0.0561 0.001 0.009 -0.423 -0.191 
 (-0.41) (-0.19) (0.19) (-1.58) (0.71) (0.01) (0.19) (-1.26) (-1.38) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.026 0.138 -0.008 -0.109* 0.0925 0.055 -0.008 -0.361 0.897*** 
 (-0.38) (1.36) (-0.20) (-1.71) (1.14) (0.60) (-0.20) (-1.03) (6.75) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥 -0.069 -0.017 -0.022 -0.122* -0.0889 -0.152*** -0.022 0.386 -0.570* 
 (-0.84) (-0.13) (-0.59) (-1.68) (-1.04) (-2.99) (-0.59) (1.23) (-1.85) 
Constant 7.779*** 5.162*** 5.853*** 5.773*** 5.270*** 5.484*** 5.489*** 4.864*** 4.951*** 
 (93.31) (34.13) (161.76) (89.69) (45.47) (21.83) (47.57) (25.74) (23.45) 
N 146 121 143 146 143 74 142 101 26 
NxT 1,961 1,068 1,833 1,841 1,762 468 1,833 509 148 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis. Models are estimated using linear fixed effects estimation on 
the logarithm of non-health expenditure for each time period 𝑡−2 to 𝑡12 prior to or after the shock. Expenditure items in broad 
categories include: Leisure – dining and/or drinking out, entertainment, sports, hobbies and leisure equipment, package tours 
and vacation. Housing cost – mortgage, property tax, home and content insurance, rent. Utilities – utilities and other fuels, 
communication. Transport – road use fees, vehicle insurance, petrol, vehicle repair and maintenance, public transport. 
Domestic services – domestic and housekeeping. Home repairs – home repairs and maintenance.  
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Period 𝑡−2 0.011 -0.017 0.017 0.024* 0.013 -0.021 0.028* 0.019 0.004 
 (1.20) (-0.85) (1.54) (1.68) (0.97) (-1.34) (1.73) (0.86) (0.37) 
Period 𝑡−1 0.008 0.025 -0.002 0.030** -0.007 -0.008 0.012 -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.78) (1.12) (-0.14) (2.16) (-0.45) (-0.45) (0.67) (-0.41) (-1.35) 
Period 𝑡0 0.018* 0.020 0.021 0.035** 0.019 0.0011 0.018 0.008 -0.003 
 (1.87) (1.03) (1.55) (2.37) (1.37) (0.06) (1.13) (0.41) (-0.26) 
Period 𝑡1 0.003 0.010 0.0002 0.024 -0.002 -0.012 0.014 0.0311 -0.012 
 (0.27) (0.49) (0.01) (1.48) (-0.11) (-0.74) (0.78) (1.37) (-1.32) 
Period 𝑡2 0.018* 0.021 0.026* 0.031* 0.019 -0.007 0.038** 0.006 -0.0000 
 (1.70) (1.05) (1.89) (1.84) (1.32) (-0.50) (2.20) (0.26) (-0.00) 
Period 𝑡3 0.014 0.039* 0.004 0.028* -0.013 0.006 -0.004 -0.024 -0.008 
 (1.37) (1.82) (0.32) (1.78) (-0.78) (0.38) (-0.26) (-1.04) (-0.85) 
Period 𝑡4 0.0003 -0.003 -0.008 0.004 -0.011 -0.009 -0.012 -0.0100 -0.015** 
 (0.03) (-0.14) (-0.55) (0.21) (-0.70) (-0.53) (-0.64) (-0.46) (-2.38) 
Period 𝑡5 0.0039 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.005 -0.041** -0.0260 -0.010 -0.012 
 (0.37) (0.39) (0.35) (0.50) (0.30) (-2.41) (-1.32) (-0.39) (-1.60) 
Period 𝑡6 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.012 0.017 -0.013 -0.0117 0.008 0.002 
 (0.80) (0.68) (0.84) (0.67) (1.09) (-0.74) (-0.62) (0.33) (0.21) 
Period 𝑡7 0.010 -0.009 0.016 0.026 0.007 -0.032 0.0001 -0.016 -0.012 
 (1.01) (-0.45) (1.08) (1.43) (0.42) (-1.64) (0.01) (-0.62) (-1.11) 
Period 𝑡8 0.016** 0.004 0.012 0.028 -0.004 -0.027 -0.0080 -0.016 -0.014** 
 (2.05) (0.19) (0.78) (1.54) (-0.23) (-1.47) (-0.39) (-0.62) (-2.21) 
Period 𝑡9 0.008 -0.012 0.021 -0.004 0.001 -0.012 -0.0011 -0.011 -0.020*** 
 (0.78) (-0.60) (1.37) (-0.18) (0.04) (-0.62) (-0.06) (-0.42) (-3.09) 
Period 𝑡10 0.016** -0.007 0.007 0.058*** -0.006 0.005 -0.0126 0.009 -0.013** 
 (1.97) (-0.36) (0.45) (3.53) (-0.29) (0.28) (-0.63) (0.34) (-2.34) 
Period 𝑡11 0.003 0.011 -0.014 0.010 -0.035* 0.006 -0.0128 0.050* -0.014** 
 (0.33) (0.48) (-0.73) (0.47) (-1.70) (0.26) (-0.63) (1.84) (-2.46) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥 0.009 0.020 -0.005 -0.004 0.025 0.005 -0.0151 0.034 -0.007 
 (0.77) (0.91) (-0.29) (-0.20) (1.41) (0.25) (-0.63) (1.21) (-1.09) 
Constant 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.004 0.0126 0.001 -0.006 
 (1.28) (0.35) (1.01) (1.11) (1.35) (0.24) (0.98) (0.07) (-0.56) 
N 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
NxT 7,145 7,145 7,145 7,145 7,145 7,145 7,145 7,145 7,145 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis. Models are estimated using linear fixed effects estimation on 
whether individuals have positive non-health expenditure for each time period 𝑡−2 to 𝑡12 prior to or after the shock. Expenditure 
items in broad categories include: Leisure – dining and/or drinking out, entertainment, sports, hobbies and leisure equipment, 
package tours and vacation. Housing cost – mortgage, property tax, home and content insurance, rent. Utilities – utilities and 
other fuels, communication. Transport – road use fees, vehicle insurance, petrol, vehicle repair and maintenance, public 




Table OA.8. Effect of having heart disease on the logarithm of non-health expenditure by spending categories 
 
Total non-





Period 𝑡−2 0.029 0.109* -0.004 -0.002 -0.014 -0.042 -0.028 -0.075 0.047 
 (0.82) (1.74) (-0.05) (-0.08) (-0.37) (-0.93) (-0.32) (-0.62) (0.53) 
Period 𝑡−1 -0.024 -0.068 0.001 -0.042* -0.030 -0.056 -0.126 -0.132 0.023 
 (-0.67) (-1.16) (0.01) (-1.78) (-0.80) (-1.34) (-1.46) (-1.21) (0.27) 
Period 𝑡0 0.056 0.024 0.037 0.022 -0.006 -0.034 -0.004 -0.136 0.191** 
 (1.61) (0.49) (0.53) (1.04) (-0.18) (-0.76) (-0.06) (-1.43) (1.99) 
Period 𝑡1 -0.006 -0.018 0.002 -0.041* 0.027 -0.012 -0.014 -0.160 -0.017 
 (-0.18) (-0.28) (0.03) (-1.70) (0.74) (-0.29) (-0.21) (-1.52) (-0.18) 
Period 𝑡2 0.007 0.056 -0.040 0.012 -0.004 -0.022 -0.114 -0.142 0.049 
 (0.20) (1.09) (-0.64) (0.56) (-0.11) (-0.50) (-1.62) (-1.31) (0.44) 
Period 𝑡3 -0.023 -0.004 -0.079 0.003 0.007 -0.030 0.007 -0.150 -0.180* 
 (-0.64) (-0.07) (-1.29) (0.13) (0.21) (-0.66) (0.09) (-1.29) (-1.98) 
Period 𝑡4 -0.010 -0.006 -0.099 -0.001 0.002 -0.105** 0.084 -0.287** 0.010 
 (-0.24) (-0.11) (-1.35) (-0.04) (0.06) (-2.13) (1.28) (-2.53) (0.10) 
Period 𝑡5 -0.080** -0.030 -0.130** -0.041 -0.048 -0.095** 0.085 -0.143 -0.089 
 (-2.14) (-0.49) (-2.08) (-1.59) (-1.12) (-2.09) (1.33) (-1.00) (-1.08) 
Period 𝑡6 -0.029 -0.015 -0.056 -0.013 0.002 -0.052 0.184** 0.013 -0.100 
 (-0.75) (-0.23) (-0.82) (-0.57) (0.04) (-1.07) (2.12) (0.09) (-1.10) 
Period 𝑡7 -0.044 0.055 -0.018 0.009 0.016 -0.048 0.120 -0.022 -0.035 
 (-1.11) (0.93) (-0.26) (0.45) (0.39) (-0.94) (1.61) (-0.18) (-0.29) 
Period 𝑡8 -0.057 0.027 -0.031 -0.024 -0.007 -0.088 0.053 0.036 -0.019 
 (-1.30) (0.42) (-0.44) (-1.02) (-0.16) (-1.55) (0.64) (0.29) (-0.27) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.077** -0.001 0.028 -0.040 -0.072* -0.103** 0.042 -0.217 -0.076 
 (-1.98) (-0.02) (0.38) (-1.21) (-1.65) (-1.97) (0.39) (-1.30) (-0.79) 
Period 𝑡10 -0.059 -0.019 -0.117* -0.027 0.029 -0.080 0.087 -0.125 -0.055 
 (-1.47) (-0.30) (-1.68) (-0.99) (0.73) (-1.51) (0.90) (-0.81) (-0.73) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.031 0.097 -0.097 -0.050* 0.017 -0.097** 0.078 0.045 -0.037 
 (-0.71) (1.46) (-1.15) (-1.73) (0.40) (-2.04) (0.83) (0.28) (-0.49) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥   -0.023 0.033 -0.042 -0.001 -0.012 -0.050 -0.041 -0.122 -0.090 
 (-0.50) (0.48) (-0.78) (-0.04) (-0.27) (-0.95) (-0.59) (-0.90) (-0.10) 
Constant 7.937*** 5.847*** 6.055*** 5.835*** 5.899*** 5.469*** 5.377*** 4.839*** 5.311*** 
 (83.49) (29.55) (21.73) (86.73) (54.19) (36.29) (68.28) (46.34) (30.68) 
N 477 463 403 468 475 468 238 346 81 
NxT 6,385 5,490 3,344 6,015 5,962 5,924 1,527 1,761 554 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis. Models are estimated using linear fixed effects estimation on 
the logarithm of non-health expenditure for each time period 𝑡−2 to 𝑡12 prior to or after the shock. Expenditure items in broad 
categories include: Leisure – dining and/or drinking out, entertainment, sports, hobbies and leisure equipment, package tours 
and vacation. Housing cost – mortgage, property tax, home and content insurance, rent. Utilities – utilities and other fuels, 
communication. Transport – road use fees, vehicle insurance, petrol, vehicle repair and maintenance, public transport. 














Period 𝑡−2 -0.0206 0.0237 -0.0392 -0.0380 -0.0736* -0.0030 -0.0478 -0.0313 -0.0144 
 (-0.64) (0.49) (-0.82) (-1.07) (-1.68) (-0.08) (-1.48) (-0.66) (-0.63) 
Period 𝑡−1 0.0032 0.0314 0.0348 0.0186 0.0074 0.0278 0.0244 0.0505 0.0005 
 (0.15) (0.73) (0.72) (0.67) (0.21) (0.76) (0.77) (1.27) (0.02) 
Period 𝑡0 0.0077 0.0034 0.0410 0.0384 0.0432 0.0311 -0.0231 0.0722 -0.0047 
 (0.32) (0.08) (1.00) (1.59) (1.33) (1.11) (-0.71) (1.55) (-0.22) 
Period 𝑡1 0.0216** 0.0010 -0.0184 0.0230 0.0206 0.0336 0.0209 -0.0114 -0.0031 
 (2.20) (0.02) (-0.47) (0.83) (0.66) (1.38) (0.66) (-0.30) (-0.22) 
Period 𝑡2 0.0374* 0.0586 0.0644 -0.0355 0.0672 0.0532* 0.0199 -0.0163 0.0234 
 (1.85) (1.20) (1.21) (-0.86) (1.57) (1.73) (0.51) (-0.42) (1.00) 
Period 𝑡3 0.0107 0.0321 0.0717 0.0200 -0.0248 -0.0508 0.0026 0.0787 0.0119 
 (0.36) (0.56) (1.46) (0.52) (-0.49) (-1.05) (0.06) (1.45) (0.49) 
Period 𝑡4 0.0322 0.0725 -0.0627 -0.0148 0.0344 0.0011 -0.0194 0.0601 -0.0043 
 (0.97) (1.36) (-1.33) (-0.38) (0.83) (0.03) (-0.53) (1.18) (-0.20) 
Period 𝑡5 0.0298 0.0378 -0.0240 -0.0175 0.0308 -0.0497 -0.0311 0.0487 -0.0116 
 (0.91) (0.68) (-0.47) (-0.49) (0.90) (-1.15) (-0.82) (0.97) (-0.90) 
Period 𝑡6 0.0060 0.0189 -0.0078 -0.0126 0.0133 0.0136 -0.0298 0.0483 0.0406 
 (0.26) (0.38) (-0.18) (-0.31) (0.31) (0.46) (-0.82) (0.93) (1.48) 
Period 𝑡7 -0.0446 0.0074 0.0224 0.0228 0.0193 -0.0969* -0.0481 -0.0157 -0.0223 
 (-1.28) (0.13) (0.46) (0.59) (0.47) (-1.73) (-1.09) (-0.28) (-1.32) 
Period 𝑡8 -0.0222 -0.0593 -0.0018 0.0489 -0.0873 -0.0257 -0.0158 0.0375 0.0402 
 (-0.60) (-1.11) (-0.03) (1.44) (-1.32) (-0.66) (-0.43) (0.81) (1.50) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.0038 -0.1014 -0.0169 -0.0158 -0.0406 -0.0216 0.0092 0.0081 -0.0163 
 (-0.16) (-1.43) (-0.42) (-0.40) (-0.70) (-0.43) (0.17) (0.16) (-1.05) 
Period 𝑡10 -0.0376 -0.0028 -0.0337 0.0190 -0.0089 -0.0093 0.0130 -0.0094 -0.0259 
 (-1.06) (-0.05) (-0.83) (0.44) (-0.15) (-0.23) (0.21) (-0.18) (-1.60) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.0106 -0.0415 0.0008 -0.0189 -0.1035* -0.0424 -0.0236 -0.0007 -0.0245 
 (-0.45) (-0.84) (0.02) (-0.47) (-1.68) (-0.86) (-0.74) (-0.01) (-1.21) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥 -0.0157 -0.0290 -0.0772 -0.0086 -0.1404* -0.0043 -0.0572 -0.0309 -0.0396 
 (-0.56) (-0.42) (-1.65) (-0.25) (-1.86) (-0.12) (-1.33) (-0.52) (-1.31) 
Constant 0.0087 0.0073 0.0016 0.0115 0.0183 0.0060 0.0075 -0.0032 -0.0127 
 (0.57) (0.23) (0.04) (0.43) (0.73) (0.22) (0.26) (-0.12) (-0.44) 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
NxT 1404 1404 1404 1404 1404 1404 1404 1404 1404 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis. Models are estimated using linear fixed effects estimation on 
whether individuals have positive non-health expenditure for each time period 𝑡−2 to 𝑡12 prior to or after the shock. Expenditure 
items in broad categories include: Leisure – dining and/or drinking out, entertainment, sports, hobbies and leisure equipment, 
package tours and vacation. Housing cost – mortgage, property tax, home and content insurance, rent. Utilities – utilities and 
other fuels, communication. Transport – road use fees, vehicle insurance, petrol, vehicle repair and maintenance, public 













Period 𝑡−2 -0.131 0.165 -0.023 0.032 -0.030 -0.044 0.023 
 (-1.13) (0.78) (-0.17) (0.54) (-0.16) (-0.52) (0.05) 
Period 𝑡−1 0.080 -0.037 -0.083 0.010 -0.089 0.040 -0.197 
 (0.80) (-0.28) (-0.65) (0.18) (-0.74) (0.49) (-0.68) 
Period 𝑡0 0.068 -0.101 0.003 -0.020 0.200 -0.044 0.212 
 (0.81) (-0.97) (0.03) (-0.45) (0.89) (-0.61) (1.01) 
Period 𝑡1 -0.043 -0.112 0.043 -0.060 -0.040 0.030 -0.110 
 (-0.46) (-0.96) (0.29) (-1.10) (-0.20) (0.41) (-0.42) 
Period 𝑡2 -0.073 -0.128 -0.004 -0.038 0.065 -0.011 -0.126 
 (-0.77) (-0.92) (-0.02) (-0.66) (0.34) (-0.12) (-0.44) 
Period 𝑡3 -0.081 -0.305** 0.140 0.001 -0.237 -0.094 -0.550 
 (-0.74) (-2.35) (0.70) (0.02) (-0.92) (-0.95) (-1.54) 
Period 𝑡4 -0.222** -0.012 0.073 -0.017 0.022 -0.141 0.146 
 (-2.19) (-0.08) (0.51) (-0.31) (0.10) (-1.57) (0.72) 
Period 𝑡5 -0.072 0.002 -0.078 -0.117** -0.399 -0.032 -0.303 
 (-0.70) (0.01) (-0.50) (-2.00) (-1.65) (-0.34) (-0.95) 
Period 𝑡6 0.029 -0.107 0.017 0.042 0.104 -0.057 -0.037 
 (0.32) (-0.61) (0.10) (0.85) (0.41) (-0.64) (-0.15) 
Period 𝑡7 0.011 -0.126 -0.154 -0.038 -0.265 -0.068 0.294 
 (0.11) (-0.60) (-0.80) (-0.70) (-0.87) (-0.59) (0.96) 
Period 𝑡8 0.074 0.139 -0.027 -0.101 -0.025 0.048 -0.052 
 (0.63) (0.64) (-0.16) (-1.36) (-0.13) (0.41) (-0.13) 
Period 𝑡9 -0.131 -0.086 0.021 -0.112* -0.102 -0.138 0.018 
 (-0.99) (-0.57) (0.14) (-1.76) (-0.41) (-0.98) (0.07) 
Period 𝑡10 -0.076 -0.206 0.141 -0.122 -0.058 -0.054 0.117 
 (-0.76) (-1.20) (1.20) (-1.38) (-0.21) (-0.79) (0.23) 
Period 𝑡11 -0.129 -0.622*** 0.057 -0.097 -0.354 -0.003 -0.619** 
 (-1.00) (-3.56) (0.36) (-1.54) (-1.31) (-0.03) (-2.28) 
Period 𝑡12−𝑚𝑎𝑥 -0.178 -0.247 -0.135 -0.057 0.009 0.115 0.138 
 (-1.52) (-1.32) (-0.69) (-0.74) (0.04) (1.26) (0.28) 
Constant 7.572*** 5.468*** 6.281*** 5.804*** 4.911*** 5.861*** 3.519*** 
 (76.91) (42.87) (9.34) (103.81) (36.07) (65.65) (26.77) 
N 93 93 70 91 19 93 61 
NxT 1,247 941 524 1,135 138 1,108 252 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics in parenthesis. Models are estimated using linear fixed 
effects estimation on the logarithm of non-health expenditure for each time period 𝑡−2 to 𝑡12 prior to or after 
the shock. Expenditure items in broad categories include: Leisure – dining and/or drinking out, entertainment, 
sports, hobbies and leisure equipment, package tours and vacation. Housing cost – mortgage, property tax, 
home and content insurance, rent. Utilities – utilities and other fuels, communication. Domestic services – 
domestic and housekeeping. Home repairs – home repairs and maintenance. Food and Transport are excluded 
due to small sample sizes. 
 
